Keeping the World Safe from Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art Images in the Public Domain through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital Reproductions by Butler, Kathleen Connolly
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 21 | Number 1 Article 2
1-1-1998
Keeping the World Safe from Naked-Chicks-in-Art
Refigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art
Images in the Public Domain through Copyrights
in Photographic and Digital Reproductions
Kathleen Connolly Butler
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathleen Connolly Butler, Keeping the World Safe from Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art Images in the
Public Domain through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital Reproductions, 21 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 55 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol21/iss1/2
Keeping the World Safe from
Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refrigerator
Magnets: The Plot to Control Art
Images in the Public Domain




I. Background .................................................... 59
A. The Connection between
Modem Means of Reproduction
and a Meaningful Exercise of
Public-Domain Rights in
V isual A rts ..................................................... 59
B. Efforts to Control Public-Domain
Im ages ................. ....................................... 66
II. What is an Original Art Reproduction? .... . . . . . . . . 78
A. The Originality Requirement ....................... 78
B. Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts: The
Distinguishable-Variation Test ................... 80
C. Alva Studios v. Winninger. The Skill,
Labor, and Judgment Test .......................... 87
D. The Tests Overlap and Become
More Stringent .......................................... 95
1. L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder: The
Turning Point ........................................ 95
2. The Batlin Influence ............................... 98
a. Heam v. Meyer ................................... 98
* Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School. B.S.S. 1976,
M.A.T. 1979, Northwestern University. J.D. 1989, University of Illinois College of
Law. The author would like to thank her husband, William M. Butler, for asking
her opinion of copyright advice he received at a museum conference and thereby
inspiring this article, and Stephen M. Sheppard for critiquing an early draft.
b. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange ............... 101
E. Summary of the Originality Tests for
Art Reproductions Today .............................. 102
III. Are All Photographs Original? ........................... 103
IV. Do Photographic and Digital
Reproductions of Public-Domain
Artworks Satisfy the Originality
Requirem ent? .................................................... 107
A. Reproductions of Three-Dimensional
A rt W orks ..................................................... 107
B. Reproductions of Two-Dimensional
A rtw orks ...................................................... 110
1. Testing Photographic and Digital
Reproductions for Substantial
V ariations ................................................ 110
2. Applying the Skill, Labor, and
Judgm ent Test ......................................... 115
3. The Public Benefit Argument ................... 125
V . C onclusion ........................................................ 126
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 21:55
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND DIGITAL REPRODUCTIONS
Introduction
What the modem means of reproduction have done is to
destroy the authority of art and to remove it-or, rather, to
remove its images which they reproduce-from any preserve.
For the first time ever, images of art have become ephemeral,
ubiquitous, insubstantial, available, valueless, free. They
surround us in the same way as a language surrounds us.
They have entered the mainstream of life over which they no
longer, in themselves, have power.
-- John Berger, art critic'
A lot of people wouldn't know who Monet is if they hadn't
bought a T-shirt or poster first.
-Janet Smith, sales representative
2
A tourist enters the Nineteenth-Century American
Paintings Gallery in an art museum. The paintings there have
all passed into the public domain; no one holds the copyright
to any of them. The tourist, planning to exercise her right to
copy works in the public domain, pulls her camera from her
bag to photograph one of the paintings. A guard steps
forward. "No pictures in the galleries, ma'am." She returns her
camera to her bag without taking the photograph, and
instead, as she leaves the museum, stops in the gift shop and
purchases the museum's own photograph of the painting. On
the photograph, she sees a copyright notice, which prohibits
her from copying, adapting, or publicly displaying the image
she has bought.
To wield aesthetic and financial control over public-
domain artworks in their collections, museums restrict the
conduct of visitors to their galleries and assert copyrights in
what are often the only usable reproductions of the works-
the museums' own photographs or transparencies. Following
the museums' lead, companies that digitally reproduce art
images also claim copyrights in their digital copies. This
practice of controlling access to public-domain artworks and
copyrighting reproductions of them is troubling because it
thwarts the principle of the public domain by preventing the
public from freely reproducing, adapting, and publicly
1. JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 32 (1972).
2. Chuck Twardy, Pop Goes the Easel, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, North
Carolina), May 5, 1996 (Arts & Entertainment), at G1, available in WESTLAW,
1996 WL 2877977.
1998]
displaying images 3 that now belong to everyone. A museum
scholar has conceded that similar practices applied to literary
works would be "outlandish."4
Suppose the Folger Shakespeare Library began to collect
performance fees for The Tempest. Or the Mozarteum told
the Metropolitan Opera it couldn't do an abridged, English-
language version of The Magic Flute. Or the Mark Twain
Memorial charged royalties on new editions of Tom Sawyer.5
Part I of this article discusses the historic importance of
photographic art reproduction to the public-domain principle
and explains the motivations and methods involved in
museum efforts to control public-domain images through
copyrights in photographic copies. That section also explores
the increasing importance of digital reproductions to the
exercise of public-domain rights in visual art. Because the
legitimacy of copyrights in both photographic and digital
reproductions depends on whether these works satisfy the
Constitutional and statutory requirement of "originality," Part
II of the article reviews and analyzes the "distinguishable
variation" and "skill, labor, and judgment" tests courts use to
assess whether art reproductions are sufficiently original to
merit copyright protection, and Part III critiques the line of
authority that finds originality in all photographs and hence
could be used to declare all photographic reproductions
original. In Part IV, the article returns to the two tests for
originality developed specifically for art reproductions, applies
them to photographic and digital reproductions, and
concludes that when the subject is a two-dimensional work,
such reproductions do not satisfy either of the originality
tests.
3. 17 U.S.C. §109(c) (1994) does exempt owners of lawful copies of original
works from the prohibition against public display when they display the copy
"either directly or by projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers
present at the place where the copy is located." This exemption would not permit
transmission of the image from one place to viewers located elsewhere by, for
example, computer or closed or open-circuit television. Nor would it allow
simultaneous projection of multiple images of the work, so that an art-history
professor could not project the image on individual viewing screens as part of a
lecture. Revision Note and Legislative Reports, 1976 Acts, Notes of Committee on
the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-1476.
4. Peter Walsh, Art Museums and Copyright: A Hidden Dilemma, XII VISUAL
RESOURCES 361 (1997).
5. Id.
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I
Background
A. The Connection between Modern Means of Reproduction and
a Meaningful Exercise of Public-Domain Rights in Visual Arts
Picture the Mona Lisa. Some readers have seen the
painting itself, hanging behind protective glass in the Louvre,
but the rest can summon the familiar image because they
have seen a photographic reproduction on a slide in art-
history class, in a book, or on television. 6 Before photography,
the public had little opportunity to view works of art in any
number, because the works were inaccessible-isolated in
museums, churches, palaces, and private collections spread
around the world.7 By reproducing art, the camera allowed
artworks to be in two places at one time, allowed artworks to
travel to the viewer rather than requiring the viewer to travel
to the art.8 With this new accessibility, the camera had
6. "We have to assume that the majority of art lovers get to know their
works of art almost exclusively through mechanical reproductions." Ian Knizek,
Walter Benjamin and the Mechanical Reproducibility of Art Works Revisited, 33
BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS 362 (1993). 'Today we are deluged with accurate and
convincing colour reproductions of works of art in books and magazines. The
youngest art student of today has at his or her disposal the entire repertory of
man's artistic achievements in convincing s[imilitude." Bernard Denvir, Visual
Satiety, THE ARTIST, July 1988, at 5.
7. See Knizek, supra note 6, at 361. In the 19th century, "[tihe
masterpieces of Western painting were scattered through Europe or hidden away
in private galleries. Even the assiduous grand tourist saw only a fraction and
that relatively briefly." Trevor Fawcett, Graphic versus Photographic in the
Nineteenth-Century Reproduction, ART HISTORY, June 1986, at 185.
8. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 19-20.
Photographic reproductions also made works of art more accessible and
therefore more universally appealing simply by reducing their size to one
comprehensible in a single glance, to a size that "assists men to gain a dominion
over the art work without which they could have no use for it." Knizek, supra
note 6, at 362.
Before the photograph, artworks had been reproduced through different
methods of engraving, but these were inherently untrustworthy depictions of the
art they reproduced. They could not copy literally, and in fact, the engraver often
did not even have the original before him. In addition, engravings were expensive
and time-consuming to produce. See Fawcett, supra note 7, at 185-87. "By 1879
photogravure had become the most prominent method of reproduction.
Photogenerated reproductions freed publishers from having to pay expensive
engravers' fees, and, unlike mezzotint plates, the ease with which duplicate
photogravure plates could be made from existing negatives meant that
publishers could issue an unlimited number of impressions of a popular image."
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democratized art.9 'The old selfish aristocratic days of
hoarding are gone for ever," wrote a nineteenth-century art
critic, praising the publication of a photographic series, Gems
of the Art-Treasures Exhibition.' 0 "Rare Titans, kept in cases to
be gloated over at miserly moments, will be seized and
photographed.... Great and true Art is republican, and is for
all men, needing no education to appreciate it."" The
revolution affected art scholarship profoundly, as the history
of art became the history of works that could be
photographed. 12
Photographic reproduction not only gives the public
greater access to artworks for viewing and studying, but also
allows and, inevitably, inspires the public to use those works,
in their reproduced forms, in myriad ways the originals
cannot be used. 13 When the public can use fine-art images,
whether to illustrate an essay on military history or to
decorate the refrigerator door, art is further democratized. For
the British art critic John Berger, the transformation of
CAROL WAX, THE MEZZOTINT 138 (1990). Therefore, "the real instrument of change
was the camera. By the 1860s firms . . . were mass-producing photographic
prints in sepia or black and white of works of art, their catalogues containing
thousands of entries." Denvir, supra note 6. See also Wolfgang M. Freitag, Art
Reproduction in the Library, in THE DOCUMENTED IMAGE 349, 350-51 (Gabriel P.
Weisberg & Laurinda S. Dixon, eds., 1987).
9. See Fawcett, supra note 7, at 193. Interestingly, the advent of digital
technology has been hailed by some as democratizing museums and the way
people view art. See Howard Besser, Imaging: Fine Arts, J. OF AM. Soc'Y. INFO.
Sci., Sept. 1991, at 589, 594.
10. Fawcett, supra note 7, at 194 (quoting G.W. Thombury in ATHENAEUM
859-57 (1857)).
11. Id. Of course, some in the art community would bristle at the assertion
that no education is needed to appreciate art; a current controversy over the role
of art museums is whether they should cater to the masses or serve and further
educate an already educated, elite section of the public. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN
& ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 649 (1987).
12. See generally ANDRE MALRAUX, Museum Without Walls, THE VOICES OF
SILENCE -MAN AND HIS ART 17-49 (1956).
"By the end of the nineteenth century, it had become recognized that the
history and connoisseurship of the visual arts would henceforth depend heavily,
perhaps dangerously, on photographs, slides, and photo-process-illustrated
books, catalogues and journals . . . . Art history in the future would be the
history of the photographically reproducible." Fawcett, supra note 7, at 208.
See also Maryly Snow, The Pedagogical Consequences of Photomechanical
Reproduction in the Visual Histories: From Copy Photography to Visual Mnemonics,
XII VISUAL RESOURCES 307, 311-14, 318-19 (1997).
13. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 24-29.
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artworks into easily reproducible, usable images, wrests art
away from the few specialized experts, away from any religious
or ruling class preserve, and gives it to the populace to apply
to their own lives. 14 As a new language of images, reproduced
art should
confer a new kind of power . . . to define our experiences
more precisely in areas where words are inadequate .... Not
only personal experiences, but also the essential historical
experience of our relation to the past: that is to say the
experience of seeking to give meaning to our lives, of trying
to understand the history of which we can become the active
agents. 15
Museums, Berger suggests, should logically be replaced
by personal bulletin boards, papered with "letters, snapshots,
reproductions of paintings, newspaper cuttings, original
drawings, postcards."16 What Berger describes is the idea that
art must ultimately belong to us all. What he describes,
through the lens of the art critic, is in essence the legal
concept of the public domain, which for works of visual art
has practical meaning only because of photographic
reproduction.
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution
authorizes Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 17  The "authors" protected by copyright
legislation include painters, sculptors, and a wide range of
other creators, and the "writings" protected are the varied
products of their creation. 18 The five rights secured to authors
14. See fd. at 32. Berger draws on ideas also promoted by Walter Benjamin
and Andr6 Malraux. For a critique of their politicized views of art and art
reproduction, see Barbara E. Savedoff, Looking at Art Through Photographs, 51 J.
OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM 455, 455-56 (Summer 1993).
15. BERGER, supra note 1, at 33.
16. Id. at 30.
17. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
18. See 17 U.S.C. §102 (1994); Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 U.S. 239, 249-
50 (1903); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §106[B],
§1.08 (1997).
The drafters did not intend the Copyright Clause to protect visual art. The
pre-Revolutionary English Statute of Anne, on which American copyright was
based, did not include visual art, and The Federalist Papers do not mention it.
The first copyright statutes, enacted in 1790, also did not include visual art. See
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are reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and
display, 19 but because the rights are secured "for limited
Times," the Constitution envisions, and the Copyright Act
establishes, a time20 when those rights belong no longer to the
writers, painters, and sculptors who made the works but to
the public. The works become public domain, and the public
may freely reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and display
the works or copies of them.2 ' The end of the copyright
monopoly and the release of rights to the public was designed
to balance the goal of protecting artists' interests in the fruits
of their labor with the competing but equally desirable goal of
granting the public "free access to materials essential to the
development of society.
22
The "public" for whom the public domain was established
has several main constituencies, each served in different
ways.
There is a manufacturer/producer public, such as book
publishers, film producers, record companies and
broadcasters who will be relieved of obtaining licenses and
paying royalties for use of public domain works. There is
also a creative artist public who can utilize works from the
public domain in adaptations or arrangements as well as in
dramatizations and translations which they, in turn, can
copyright as a new work in revised form .... A third public
is the consuming public who is presumed to benefit from
competition of the producers who may bring out more varied
editions at cheaper prices than if exclusive control still
existed over the work involved.23
In addition, scholars and educators form a significant
fourth sector of that public. In the visual-arts world, they are
the art historians who use copies of public-domain artworks
JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT & ARCHITECTURE LAW §7.02[1] (1995).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 1.06 (1994). The performance right applies to literary,
musical, dramatic, choreographic, and audiovisual works and not to pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, which are the subject of this article. 17 U.S.C. §
106(4). See also supra note 3, regarding the extent of the statutory exemption
from the prohibition against public display for owners of lawful copies.
20. Until recently, a work was protected until fifty years after the author's
death. 17 U.S.C. §302(a). The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act has
amended 17 U.S.C. §302(a) to extend the time to life plus seventy. Pub.L.No.
105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
21. See id.
22. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at §1.05[D], § 4.03.
23. M.W. Krasilovsky, Observations on Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SocY'. 205, 213 (1967).
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to illustrate research papers, books, and lectures. Fees for
scholarly use of art images can be prohibitive to scholars and
academics operating on limited budgets and anticipating
small, if any, profits from the works in which they include art
images.2 4 Free use of images in the public domain lessens this
burden and supports art scholarship and understanding.
Aided by modern means of reproduction, the
manufacturing public has exercised its rights in public-
domain artworks with relish, and the consuming public has
devoured their offerings.25 Among the materials essential to
the development of society are "Naked Chicks in Art"
refrigerator magnets, which feature reclining nudes by
Modigliani, Ingres, Gauguin, and Renoir.26 Shoppers can buy
24. See Walsh, supra note 4, 361-362; Robert A. Baron, Digital Fever: A
Scholar's Copyright Dilemma, 15 MUSEUM MGMT. & CURATORSHIP 49, 61 (1996);
Patricia Taylor, By Line Drawings Ye Shall Know Them: Consequences of Barriers
to Digital Reproduction, XII VISUAL RESOURCES 333, 338 (1997).
Seemingly low on the priority scales of most image vendors are the
special requirements of the academic community, particularly those of
us who work in small liberal arts colleges, in independent colleges of art
and design, and in community colleges, as well as in large research-
oriented university environments. Some commercial image suppliers and
producers price their material beyond realistic consideration. They
demand substantial payment or site license fees based on formulas that
count usage per item, per application-even per student. Many of us
walk the razor's edge between inadequate and constantly shrinking
budgets on the one hand, and growing frustration over restrictions that
limit our full participation in the exciting potential of new technologies to
enhance teaching and learning opportunities on the other.
Alan Kohl, Prospects for a Public Domain Art Image Resource in an Era of Digital
Technologies, XII VISUAL RESOURCES 291, 292-93 (1997). See generally, Christine
L. Sundt, A Visual Resources Advocacy Statement, XII VISUAL RESOURCES 297
(1997); Maryly Snow, supra note 12.
25. Baron in his article notes:
The market for art reproductions has matured and is flourishing,
nurtured by the ability to produce engaging facsimiles and
reproductions of objects and by the increasing demand for them. Fine
reproductions may be found in printed books, post cards, posters, slides
and now electronic images. The scholarly population has likewise
matured, and has evolved into an industry in which the newest events,
findings and views are rendered into products or news articles suitable
for consumption by an increasingly acquisitive intelligentsia. What had
once been a community of cottage industries that provided varieties of
photographs for tourists to buy and scholars to publish without special
permission, has evolved into full scale business ventures serving a
culture-hungry population and its attendant interpreters.
Baron, supra note 24, at 56.
26. The manufacturer, Blue Q, advises on the package, "OK, OK, don't get
Mona Lisa aprons and switch plates. 27 Particularly popular
images are Raphael's angels, found on stationery, greeting
cards, and magnets; 28 and the despairing figure in Edvard
Munch's The Scream, available on posters, mugs, T-shirts,
ties, refrigerator magnets, mouse pads, and in the form of an
inflatable doll. 29 Advertisers, too, exploit the consuming
public's taste for fine-art images by using them to promote
products.30 In a television commercial, the sight of a Pontiac
Sunfire liberates Munch's Scream character from despair.
3'
Magazine advertisements for both Rice-a-Roni and American
Express have featured Edouard Manet's Luncheon on the
Grass.32 Works by Gauguin, Monet, Raphael, and other
painters have hawked products from cologne to candy to
toilets.
33
Digital scanning,34  the latest innovation in art
reproduction, has put art images on CD- ROM and the
upset, it's just paint. They're only magnets. This is what's called a novelty gift
item. Lighten up." Collection of the author.
27. See David Barton, Scream On: Why is the Ultimate Howl of Horror Popping
up on Everything from Greeting Cards to Coffee Mugs?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 22,
1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 14029129.
28. See EPM Communications, Inc., Fine Artists, Art Museums and
Contemporary Designers all Draw Inspiration from the Gift Category, LICENSING
LETrER, March 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8313169.
29. See Barton, supra note 27,
30. According to Robert Baldwin, an art historian at Connecticut College,
art-history courses and blockbuster exhibitions have grown in popularity as art
has become a more important part of American culture. This rising interest "has
given the advertising world a new pool of sophisticated imagery on which to
draw." Ronald Alsop, Fine Art is Now on Exhibit in Many Ads But Critics Say
Commercial Use Cheapens the Great Masterpieces, WALL ST. J., March 25, 1988,
available in WESTLAW, 1988 WL-WSJ 47538 1.
31. See Barton, supra note 27.
32. See Alsop, supra note 30.
33. See id.
34. Jonathan A. Franklin defines digital imaging as:
[A] process of converting a physical image, such as a painting,
sculpture, or photograph, into a string of numbers that a computer
reads to reproduce the object on a screen. A scanner or electronic
camera takes an image of the painting and breaks It down Into discrete
data points. For each point, the scanner measures the color and
converts the reading into a numerical value. The numerical value for
each point is added to the large file that represents all of the color points
that have been scanned. Once the scan is complete, the colors are
adjusted by a professional to reflect the image's actual appearance to the
human eye.
A computer reading this long string of numbers can reconstruct the
HASTINGaS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 21:55
Internet, giving members of the public access to museums
they would never visit and turning famous works of art into
royalty-free, high-quality clip art.as  Computer software
companies have been buying digital reproduction rights to
paintings and sculptures, and the most aggressive pursuer of
digital rights has been Bill Gates of Microsoft.3 6 Through
Corbis Corporation, the publishing subsidiary of Microsoft, he
has contracted to digitize, market, and distribute electronic
reproductions of images from the Seattle Art Museum, the
Philadelphia Museum of Art, the Detroit Institute of Arts, and
color of each point. When these points are put together in their original
pattern, they look like the original painting on a computer screen. If the
colors are accurately recorded, the image can be reproduced with a high
degree of accuracy.
Jonathan A. Franklin, Image Control, MUSEUM NEWS, Sept. /Oct. 1993, at 37.
35. See P.J. Huffstutter, Computer Link: Internet is Just the Ticket to Visit Fine
Art Museums, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 25, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
1994 WL 6022649. Interested readers can find in Huffstutter's article a list of
URLs for museum exhibits on the Internet. See also Greg Kane, Classic Graphics
Puts Museun of Art into Personal Computer, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 14,
1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 5701947; Richard L. Hudson, License
Needed to Do Art Deals in Digital Age, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL- WSJ 2105424.
After his first experience with the National Gallery of Art's new Micro Gallery,
the editor of Museum News wrote:
Of course I was looking at a reproduction, but for the first time I realized
that a digitized reproduction on a high-quality, color computer screen is
far more satisfying and revealing than anything on the printed page.
Combine this with the interactive options, and I felt that I had
discovered a new realm of appreciation, somewhere well beyond viewing
a reproduction in an exhibition catalogue.
John Strand, High Art, High Tech: The National Gallery of Art's New Micro Gallery,
MUSEUM NEWS, July/August 1995, at 35-36.
The appearance of this technology has been heralded with rhetoric similar to
that used to welcome photography of artworks. See supra notes 10 and 11 and
accompanying text. "he ability to display and link collections from around the
world breaks down physical barriers to access, and the potential of reaching
audiences across social and economic boundaries blurs the distinction between
the privileged few and the general public." HOWARD BESSER & JENNIFER TRANT,
INTRODUCTION TO IMAGING 7 (1995).
36. See Huffstutter, supra note 35. More than 25,000 images in the Corbis
collection are fine art. See Barbara Hoffman, From Virtual Gallery to the Legal
Web, NEW YORK L.J., March 15, 1991, at 51. See generally, Jane Lusaka, et al.,
Whose 800-lb. Gorilla Is It? Corbis Corporation Pursues Museums, MUSEUM NEWS,
May/June 1996, at 34 [hereinafter Lusaka]; Patricia Failing, Brave New World or
Just More Profitable?, ARTNEWS Oct. 1996, at 114-118.
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other prestigious institutions. 37 Corbis has also purchased the
Bettman Photo Archives.
38
B. Efforts to Control Public-Domain Images
Art museums are the richest repositories of public-domain
images to be copied and sold,39 and these institutions, which
37. See Lusaka, supra note 36, at 34.
Corbis is a small but growing company that was established to
understand, collect and effectively distribute visual materials digitally.
Corbis's mission is to build a comprehensive digital library of visual
materials (to date, primarily photography of art, history, science,
technology, and other cultural matters) as a resource to both
commercial users and consumers in their homes, schools and libraries.
The archive includes a wide variety of creative materials, generally
licensed to Corbis non-exclusively for specified uses and terms, from
over three hundred different sources that include museums,
photographers, agencies, libraries and other sources of creative
properties that retain ownership and/or control of the underlying works.
Corbis commercially distributes these digital materials through two
separate business groups. One group licenses these materials to
publishing houses, multimedia publishers, graphic artists, and other
professional publishers for incorporation into their products. Another
business group distributes the archive directly to consumers, through
interactive documentary products on CD-ROM. Corbis currently is
exploring commercial opportunities for the archive in the burgeoning
online environment.
Thomas K. Landry, ed., Columbia-VIA Journal of the Arts Roundtable on
Electronic Rights, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 605, 610 n.8, (1996) [hereinafter
Roundtable]. The Corbis Web site is www.corbis.com.
38. See Failing, supra note 36, at 116. This added over 16 million film and
digital images to the Corbis collection. See id.; Lusaka, supra note 36, at 35. One
cultural critic commented on this purchase:
In gaining ownership of so many images, Gates has also acquired the
reproduction rights to what many might have thought to be a public
resource-history. Remember that image of Truman holding up the
premature issue of the Chicago Daily Tribune declaring his defeat by
Dewey? Corbis owns it. Remember Malcolm X pointing out over his
crowd of listeners, the airship Hindenberg exploding in the New Jersey
sky, that naked Vietnamese child running towards us after being burned
by napalm, Churchill flashing his V-for-victory sign, Dorothea Lange's
Migrant Mother, Patty Hearst posing with her gun in front of the
Symbionese Liberation Army banner, LBJ being sworn into office aboard
Air Force One beside a blood-spattered Jackie? Corbis controls the
electronic rights to them all, and with those rights it also controls the
ability of our culture to reproduce its memories if itself.
Geoffrey Batchen, Manifest Data: The Image in the Age of Electronic Reproduction,
AFTERIMAGE, Nov. /Dec. 96, at 6.
39. Museums are attractive sources of images to electronic purchasers
because museums hold large numbers of a desirable product and their names
have market value. Also, these purchasers believe that the fewer sources they
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typically depend on charitable donations to fund their
budgets, can significantly boost revenues through art
merchandising and licensing. 40  Despite the financial
enticements,4 1 museums are cautious about commercializing
negotiate with, the easier it will be for them to resolve issues about rights. See
Suzanne Muchnic, Technoarts: In Cyberspace Can Anyone Really Appreciate Art?
CD-ROMs are Giving Home Computer Users Access to Museum and Private
Collections. But Some Institutions are Holding Back for Fear of Losing Control - and
Dollars, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at Calendar 4, available in WESTLAW, 1994
WL 2150925.
40. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Museums Step Up their Retailing to Trn Art into
Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997 at Metro/B5. Between 1986 and 1996, the
New York Metropolitan Museum of Art opened fourteen gift shops in the United
States and nineteen stores in other countries, doubling merchandising revenue
from $38 million in 1986 to $79 million in 1996. See id. All profits, from 10 to 12
percent of revenues, went into the operating budget of the museum. Id.
According to another report, the Metropolitan grossed $82 million in fiscal year
1993-94 from the sale of reproductions of fine art and derivative works. See Jill
I. Prater, When Museums Act like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works
Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 97, 97-98 (1996). In
1996, the Metropolitan reported merchandising revenues of $88.23 million in a
total museum budget of $103.9 million. See Twardy, supra note 2.
In 1994, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts earned an estimated $35 million
in revenue from its catalog, shops, and wholesale distribution. See Prater, supra
note 40, at 97-98.
The four Chicago-area stores of the Art Institute of Chicago report annual
sales of $10 million. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Exploiting the Artist's Commercial
Identity: The Merchandizing of Art Images, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 1
(1995).
This is not to say that these profits are derived solely from products based
on images in the particular museum's collection. Museums sell posters, books,
and other items that are not derived solely from their own collections.
In addition to income from on-site gift shops, museums profit from licensing
agreements with manufacturers and privately-owned gift shops as well as with
advertisers who want to use art images to give their products a more
sophisticated or luxurious look. See Alsop, supra note 30.
The newest income-stream for museums that choose to participate comes
from contracts with electronic services such as Corbis that digitize art images for
use on CD-ROM and the Internet. In addition to the financial benefit, some
museum staffers say that art merchandising and licensing have exposed new
audiences to fine art and brought new patrons through their doors. See Twardy,
supra note 2; Muchnic, supra note 39.
Sally Williams of The Brooklyn Museum has said, "For museums like ours,
revenues from copyrights and reproductions are an important part of what we
live on." Huffstutter, supra note 35.
41. In addition to fees or royalties, companies seeking digital rights offer
museums free digital services, which can be extremely helpful in conservation,
registration, education, and in archiving copies of the collection. This is an
excellent benefit for the museums, because digitizing one existing transparency
can cost over $20, and hiring a professional photographer can cost $1,000 per
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the images in their collections 42 for fear of losing aesthetic and
financial control over images released into the world as
photographic or digital reproductions. 43 Museums hold the
artworks in their collections in trust for the public, and their
role as stewards imposes a duty to preserve the artworks and
to educate the public about them.44 One reason museums try
to control public-domain images is that they interpret the
duties of their stewardship to include a responsibility to
protect the integrity of the works in their collections.4 5 Until
recently, the greatest threat to the integrity of artworks was
simply that poor quality reproductions might misrepresent the
appearance of a work. Museums were concerned about
inaccurate colors, cropping, and reproduced details that were
not identified as only part of a work.46 With the boom in art
day. Very few museums own digitizing equipment, which costs in the tens of
thousands of dollars. See Lusaka, supra note 36, at 36-37; Franklin, supra note
34, at 39, 54.
42. Many museums, for example, refuse to license works for advertising
purposes. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Museums have also
been surprisingly slow to enter agreements with software companies for
electronic reproduction rights. See Franklin, supra note 34, at 37; Barbara
Hoffman, The Legal Web and the Virtual Gallery, NEW YORK L.J., Mar. 22, 1996,
at 56.
43. See Franklin, supra note 34, at 37, 54; Muchnic, supra note 39.
44. John Henry Merryman, Are Museum Trustees and the Law Out of Step?,
ARTNEWS, Nov. 1975, at 24-27, reprinted in LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS
677 (John Henry Merryman and Albert E. Elsen, eds., 1987). See also MARILYN
PHELAN, MUSEUMS AND THE LAW 154-56 (1982); MARIE C. MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER
ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 3-18 (1985).
The American Association of Museums defines a museum as an "organized
and permanent non-profit institution, essentially educational or aesthetic in
purpose, with professional staff, which owns and utilizes tangible objects, cares
for them, and exhibits them to the public on some regular schedule." The term
"care" is defined as "keeping adequate records pertaining to the provenance,
identification, location of the museum's holdings and the application of current
professionally accepted methods to their security and to the minimization of
damage and deterioration." The "essentially educational or aesthetic" purpose is
carried out "by knowledgeable utilization of its objects and exhibits for
elucidation and enjoyment." William Hendon, Analyzing an Art Museum (1979),
reprinted in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN AND ALBERT E. ELSEN, EDS., LAW, ETHICS, AND
THE VISUAL ARTS 641-642 (1987).
45. See Muchnic, supra note 39; Suzanne Muchnic, Art World Meets the
Techno World; The Arts: An International Group of Museum Directors is Gathering
in Seattle to Ponder the Technological New Age and the Impact on Institutions, L.A.
TIMES, June 1, 1994, at Fl, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 2171296
[hereinafter Muchnic #21; Taylor, supra note 24, at 334-35.
46. See Nancy Kirkpatrick, Rights and Reproductions in Art Museums,
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merchandising and the ease of image manipulation permitted
by digital technology, some museum staffers and art scholars,
who believe that protecting the integrity of artworks also
means ensuring that the works are treated respectfully, now
worry that commercial uses of art reproductions will cheapen
and trivialize art works.47 Some museums refuse to license
works for use in any advertising or promotion, 48 while others
review such requests on a case-by-case basis, turning down
requests for uses that would promote certain types of
products, such as alcohol,4 9 or for uses that are "flip and
disrespectful."50 Digital reproduction raises special concerns
MUSEUM NEWS, Feb. 1986, at 45, 48; Walsh, supra note 4, at 362. These do
continue to be concerns. "We don't like to have a bad reproduction floating
around, exposed to people who haven't seen your museum," said Holly Witchey,
associate curator of European Art at the San Diego Museum of Art. "They get the
wrong idea about the quality of work in your collection, then don't want to
explore your museum when they visit San Diego." Huffstutter, supra note 35.
David Ross, director of the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York,
disagrees. He argues that this is an excuse to avoid exploring the future of
museums and compares it to purists' objections to engravings in the Middle
Ages. He contends people will always prefer to see a work in real life. See id.
47. See Taylor, supra note 24, at 335; Alsop, supra note 30. Art historian
and museum curator Peter Flagg, commenting on the inflatable versions of
Edvard Munch's The Scream, complains, "For one thing they're just the figure,
you don't get the whole context, the bridge, the sky, the long projection of this
march to oblivion. It becomes a pop icon when it's extracted from context.
What's disturbing about doing that is that they're cheapening the image. They're
taking an art object and turning it into a commodity in order to make money."
Barton, supra note 27.
Indeed, the object can become cheapened and vulgarized through the
inappropriate reproduction. Electronically produced virtual galleries and
virtual museums must take special care. Digital representations could
be displayed out of context, with misleading or with no sense of scale
and materiality, what Robert Baron refers to as 'the union of the
museum with the video-game arcade.'
Snow, supra note 12, at 317. "Instead of serving the mission of communicating
deep cultural knowledge, cultural institutions may find their practices [of
participating in the digital market] debase or misinterpret authentic culture."
David Bearman & Jennifer Trant, Museums and Intellectual Property: Rethinking
Rights Management for a Digital World, XII VISUAL RESOURCES 269, 271 (1997).
Not all museums regard great artworks as sacred. The director of graphics
and reproductions at the Art Institute of Chicago finds parodies of Sunday
Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte and American Gothic "a riot." She
adds, "The money is nice, too." Alsop, supra note 30.
48. See Alsop, supra note 30; Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 49.
49. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 49.
50. Alsop, supra note 30. The Baltimore Museum of Art found an
advertisement for a toilet, which used Matisse's Large Reclining Nude, to be "a
1998] PHOTOGRAPHIC AND DIGITAL REPRODUCTIONS
such as the enhanced ability of editors and end users to
manipulate digital images. 5 1 When negotiating with an
emissary of Bill Gates, "[slome curators blanched when they
realised that future connoisseurs might, at the click of a
mouse, change the colour of their Monets to match their
curtains."52 In addition, interactivity, the ability of the user to
mix media in many digital products, has made museums
reluctant to license images. According to counsel for Corbis
Corporation, 'The stewards of certain creative properties do
not want their Matisse painting complemented by a 2LiveCrew
tune, and often will demand contractual restrictions on such
configurations."
53
A related concern is that the public, deluged with
reproductions of art, will lose interest in "the real thing" and,
preferring reproductions to original artworks, will stop visiting
museums. 54 Similarly, there is concern that the public's taste
slur on Matisse." The advertising agency defended the advertisement legally with
their belief that the Matisse was in the public domain and therefore free for their
use and aesthetically with the explanation that the toilet was French, like
Matisse, and beautiful. A settlement was being negotiated with the Matisse
estate. See id.
Richard Tooke, who supervises rights and reproductions at the Museum of
Modem Art in New York, will not release transparencies to any advertisers. He
says, "We're the keepers of works of art and feel it would be presumptuous of us
to decide whether the artist would want his paintings commercialized." Id. One
use museums find particularly objectionable is the alteration of an art image in
advertising, such as by inserting a product into the image-a Van Gogh self-
portrait holding a Hershey bar, a woman from A Sunday Afternoon on the Island
of La Grande Jatte holding an American Express charge receipt. Id.
51. Roundtable, supra note 37, at 620.
52. Home as Museum, ECONOMIST, November 21, 1992, at 98.
53. Roundtable, supra note 37, at 618-19. According to Stephen B. Davis,
Vice President of Strategic and Legal Affairs, Corbis Corporation, such demands
are often unacceptable to licensees who want to use an artwork in many
interactive products. See id.
54. Denvir, supra note 6; Phil Patton, The Pixels and Perils of Getting Art on
Line, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, at Sec. 2, 1. The information director for the
Museum of Modem Art in New York has been quoted as saying, "Many museums
fear their customers will become mouse potatoes: They will learn about art on
their computers and never go to museums anymore." Faye Rice, Mona Lisa for
Mouse Potatoes (Bill Gates's Company Continuum Productions Obtains Rights to
Reproduce Art Masterpieces on Software), FORrUNE, June 13, 1994, at 16. Says
Hilton Kramer, art critic and editor of The New Criterion, "It remains to be proved
that swamping people with vast quantities of counterfeit art really increases
their appreciation of the real thing. It very often just creates an appetite for more
reproductions." Twardy, supra note 2.
Others in the museum community contend the opposite-that reproductions
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in art will be limited to what it has experienced through
commercialized reproductions.5 5 Hilton Kramer, editor of The
New Criterion, bemoans the fact that increasingly museums
are catering to what he calls the "nonserious" part of the
public. 'Through increasing increments you can just see the
authority shifting away from the people who are in a position
to make judgments about objects and to those who generate
publicity."
56
The other reason museums seek control over public-
domain images in their collections is to ensure that if anyone
is to profit from cheapening and trivializing those artworks,
the museums themselves will reap the benefits.5 7 Releasing
expand their audiences by making art more familiar and accessible. Muchnic,
supra note 39. Responding to a New York Times op-ed piece in which art-critic
Jed Perl voiced his concern that virtual museums may keep audiences at home
in front of their computers, David Ross, the director of the Whitney Museum of
Art said, "Per's position seems to be that of an hysterical Luddite. And it's pure
baloney. All the evidence we have indicates the contrary. The Intelligent use of
digital technologies neither dupes people nor draws them away from the
experience of real works of art. Today the kind of fear that underpins an
argument like Perl's simply doesn't exist among collectors, dealers, auction
houses, or members of the museum community I know." Failing, supra note 36,
at 118.
55. See Twardy, supra note 2. "We have a joke around the office," says Bill
Edwards of the Museum Company, which has 76 stores selling museum-
licensed products, "if it's Monet or cats, people love it." Id. According to the
manufacturer of the inflatable Scream, "[olnly half the people that have bought it
even know it is a painting." Barton, supra note 27.
56. Twardy, supra note 2. Certainly, the release of Images to the public
domain does not always serve the stated ideal of providing materials essential to
the development of society. Sometimes it just allows the public to buy
inexpensive trinkets with an artsy cachet. Ironically, Kramer in his elitism (the
arts are for the educated) and Berger in his Marxism (the arts are for all) are not
at opposite poles. Both have lofty goals for art, and the public disappoints both-
Kramer by preferring blockbuster exhibitions and Monet calendars and Berger
by failing to be radicalized by free access to art images (see supra text
accompanying notes 1 and 16). Does the general public's failure to live up to the
highest ideals of the public domain justify an end to that benefit? Of course not.
Rich traditions of artistic appropriation and art scholarship do thrive on the
public domain, and the benefit exists for the potential it creates, not as a reward
to be presented or stripped away depending upon how well the public is
currently living up to its possibilities. And if one of the benefits of the
mechanical reproduction of public-domain artwork is that art becomes like a
language (see supra text accompanying notes 1 and 5) we are, as a society, still
learning to speak that language and need to be given the chance to improve our
fluency.
57. Most museums deny reproduction requests for products like calendars
and note cards that would compete with products the museum itself might
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high-quality reproductions to anyone increases the
opportunities for piracy of those images and profits by
others.58 Even the strongest advocates of digital technology
concur that opportunities for piracy are inherent in the
technology and that security measures within systems can be
overcome with the right skill and equipment. 59 Museums
usually restrict image licenses to a one-time use, but digital
technology is designed for repetitive use, which renders
obsolete the one-time use concept.60 Granting the wrong
license, museums fear, could result in losing the ability to
benefit from licensing the particular image in the future.
6 1
Historically, museums have been able to control
reproductions of public-domain images from their
collections. 62 Even though the right to reproduce artworks in
the public domain belongs ostensibly to anyone and everyone,
in practical terms, it does not, and anyone requiring a quality
reproduction of a public-domain image from a museum
collection will have to deal with the museum. 63 This is
develop for sale in its shop. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 49. When a
museum does license images for use in products, it generally negotiates royalties
and other rights such as free or low-priced copies of the product to sell in the
museum shop. See id.
58. "Color printers are so good that off-site distribution could permit
unscrupulous users to create and print images intended to deceive unwary
collectors into thinking they are buying the original work of art." Franklin, supra
note 34, at 54. See also Muchnic, supra note 39; Karen A. Akiyama, Rights and
Responsibilities in the Digital Age, XII VisuAL RESOURCES 261, 263-64 (1997).
59. See Muchnic, supra note 39; Franklin, supra note 34, at 38.
60. See Muchnic, supra note 39; Kim L. Milone, Comment, Dithering over
Digitization: International Copyright and Licensing Agreements Between Museums,
Artists, and New Media Publishers, 5 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 393, 395-99
(1995).
61. See Lusaka, supra note 36, at 36, 74-76; Franklin, supra note 34, at 37,
54. "[Aiccording to curator [Vicki] Porter, the Micro Gallery will not go online any
time soon because the high resolution of the images in-house would be lost,
along with control over the images themselves and their attendant copyrights."
Jo Ann Lewis, Armchair Museum-Goer, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1995, at G5.
62. This article focuses on how museums exercise that control through
copyrights in photographic reproductions. Another potential avenue of
protection, available for those works that have become symbols of the
institutions that hold them, is trademark law. See Thomas M. Smegal Jr. &
Caroline Mead, By Taking Precautions, Sellers of CD-ROMs and Multimedia
Products Can Minimize the Liability Risks Involved in Using Public-Domain Works,
NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1994, at B5. That argument is beyond the scope of this
article.
63. Ronald Alsop in his Wall Street Journal article notes that:
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because artworks are not like literary works. An artwork is a
tangible and unique object, and someone owns that object.64
Although a published literary work was once embodied in an
original manuscript, that original is not the work in the way
an original painting is. The literary work lives in its published
copies. It exists in more than one place. The owner of the
original manuscript of a published literary work cannot
control access to the content of the work because others have
access to that information through published copies.65 In
contrast, the owner of a painting that has passed into the
public domain can control access to the content of the work
by controlling physical access to the original work. 66 A private
owner can shut the painting away in a vault where no one can
see it to adapt or reproduce it, and museums can and do
establish rules for what occurs inside their galleries. 67 Some
museums forbid photography in the galleries or permit only
the kind of photography that will produce unpublishable
results. 68 Some museums instruct visitors that they may use
their own photographs for personal purposes only,6 9 while
others require visitors to sign camera permits in which they
agree not to reproduce, publish, or distribute any images they
have shot inside the museum. 70 Because artworks are objects,
the object owners, by controlling physical access to the
Control of paintings in the public domain-which include impressionist,
post impressionist and most other works advertisers want to
reproduce-generally falls to the museums that hold them. Although the
museums normally don't have any copyright claims to such works, they
do control the color transparencies that provide much higher-quality
reproduction than would a postcard or photograph in an art book.
Because good reproduction is so important in advertising, agencies
typically won't use a certain painting unless they can get the
transparencies.
Alsop, supra note 30. See also Franklin, supra note 34, at 37, 39.
64. See Baron, supra note 24, at 57.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Writing for a museum audience, one author explains, "If a visitor takes a
photograph of a work of art that is in the public domain and hangs in a
museum, the visitor owns the rights to that photograph and may reproduce it.
For this reason, many museums insist that all visitors with a camera sign a
permit." Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 48.
68. See Baron, supra note 24, at 57; Walsh, supra note 4, at 366.
69. See Baron, supra note 24, at 57.
70. See id.; Walsh, supra note 4, at 366.
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objects, have the opportunity and power to govern how
reproductions of those objects are made, used, and licensed. 7'
As stewards of art for the public, museums cannot
exercise complete control over their collections. Not only must
museums preserve art and educate the public, but they must
also make works available to the public for use.7 2 Therefore,
museums routinely hire photographers to make photographs
and transparencies of the works in their collections and will
license or rent these images to scholars and others, usually
for a one-time use, for a fee, and subject to various
limitations. 3
The most significant control museums exert over public-
domain art is to assert that the photographic reproduction
provided by the museum is itself a copyrighted work and that
the museum holds the copyright to the reproduction.74 By
controlling access to the original artwork, so that the public
cannot make its own direct copies, and also asserting a
copyright in the only usable photographic reproductions of a
public-domain image, the museum manages to control the
public's ability to exercise its rights in a public-domain
work. 7 5 In other words, the museums intentionally circumvent
the public-domain status of these works and obtain
71. See Baron, supra note 24, at 57, "When a museum negotiates with a
software developer, it is licensing the right to electronically reproduce
professionally taken photographs of the works in the museum. The works
themselves may be public domain, but the software developer is really buying a
right of access to their reproduced images." Franklin, supra note 34, at 39.
72. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 45; Malaro, supra note 44, at 290-97.
73. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 45-46, 48-49. Copyright claimants
may restrict the transformation of the reproduction, from making drastic
alterations to cropping the work for detailed view. See Taylor, supra note 24, at
335. A thorough look at typical fees and use restrictions can be found in a 1995
survey conducted by the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston; entitled
Rights and Reproductions Survey November 1995, it is available by contacting
the Gardner or the author of this article. It is referred to hereinafter as "Gardner
Survey." Common restrictions on licensed images noted by the Gardner Survey
include prohibitions of: advertising use, variations from the original, use of
details without advance permission and identification as details, and black and
white reproduction of color transparencies. Gardner Survey, supra, at 41.
Museums also request approval of color proofs and credit lines in publications.
Id. at 41-42.
74. See Baron, supra note 24, at 57-58; See also Franklin, supra note 34,
39; Walsh, supra note 4, at 366; Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 47; Roundtable,
supra note 37, at 640-4 1.
75. See Baron, supra note 24, at 57-59.
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something close to a copyright in public-domain art images by
claiming copyrights in their photographic copies.76 This raises
the question, as posed by one art scholar, "Does the fact that
a photograph provides an image of a unique, privately-held
original object confer, in practice, perpetuity rights to the
object's owner?-rights that are more durable than copyright
itself?"
77
Relying on the museum practice of asserting copyrights in
photographic reproductions, digitizers such as Corbis have
applied for and been granted copyrights in their digital
reproductions. 78 This is a significant move. In the future,
digital images will be the primary means of reproducing art
76. Museums are advised, 'Through the use of copyrighted photographs,
museums can control reproduction of works they own that are in the public
domain." Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 47. Another article offers similar advice:
Although there appears to be some discrepancy in how far the courts
will go in conferring copyright on art reproductions, the historical
tendency has been expansive. For this reason, the museum should
always claim copyright in any reproduction that appears in a poster,
postcard, advertisement, brochure, or three-dimensional model ....
[Wihen the underlying work falls into the public domain, the whole world
may copy it. The museum's copyright in its reproduction, however will
not be affected by the underlying work falling into the public domain,
and its copyright in its derivative work will continue for the full duration.
Rhonda L. Berkowitz & Marshall A. Leaffer, Copyright and the Art Museum, 8
COLUM. J. ART & LAW 249, 265-67 (1984).
77. Baron, supra note 24, at 57. Prof. Ralph S. Brown has recognized that
copyrights in derivative works "may be misused to block access to a public
domain original." Ralph S. Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works
Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (1984).
78. Roundtable, supra note 37, at 640-41; Lusaka, supra note 36, at 29, 76.
"Assuming the underlying image may have fallen into the public domain,
does the placing of a public domain image in an electronic form create a
derivative work entitled to copyright protection? Mr. Gates is betting a lot of
money that it does." Hoffman, supra note 36.
It is important to remember that the mere fact that a copyright has been
granted does not establish the validity of the copyright. 'The Copyright Office, by
accepting material as copyrightable, does not thereby determine [the applicant's]
rights under copyright laws any more than a registrar of documents covering
land titles, by accepting a deed for recording, determines title of the grantee
therein to the land." Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
"It is clear . . . that a certificate of registration creates no irrebuttable
presumption of copyright validity." Durham Indus. Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980). "[W]hile the Register of Copyrights may (subject to
judicial review) refuse to issue a registration certificate for a purported work of
art on the grounds of lack of creativity, denial of copyright for lack of originality
represents an issue of fact that should be determined exclusively by the courts."
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at § 2.08[B] n.71.
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images because digital images can be copied without losing
resolution, printed without being exposed to chemicals, and
stored archivally without risking deterioration. 79  Digital
storage also requires far less space than storage of
transparencies. 80 In addition, digital technology is a highly
versatile medium that offers instructors limitless new
possibilities, such as superimposing analytic diagrams on an
original work, morphing from one image to another to
illustrate a relationship, and providing instant global access to
copies of an art image without the encumbrance of slides.8 1
The museum practice has gone long unchallenged,
probably because obtaining museum transparencies has in
the past been easy and inexpensive.82 Museums have relied
on the in terrorem value of these declarations of copyright
rather than pursuing violations and incurring the costs of
litigation and running the risk of establishing precedent that
holds the copyrights to be invalid.8 3 Also, for a long time the
79. PHILIP KREJCAREK, DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHY-A HANDS-ON INTRODUCTION 8, 35
(1997); see also Bearman & Trant, supra note 47, at 269; Franklin, supra note
34, at 39.
80. See Franklin, supra note 34, at 39.
81. See Taylor, supra note 24, at 336. For example, "[wlith the touch of a
button, [an] instructor can zip from Mary Cassatt to Jackson Pollock, and then
zoom in on details of each work." Susannah Cassedy O'Donnell, At the National
Gallery of Art: The "Disc"-overy of American Art, MUSEUM NEWS, Sept./Oct. 1993,
at 38.
Educational uses of digital images are not limited to art history. Teaching
and scholarship in history increasingly rely on visual materials from the periods
being studied. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Museums Collaborate to Place Thousands
of Their Art Treasures on Line, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 17, 1998, at 29.
Digital images are useful to foreign-language students assigned art-related
research and writing projects. See id.
82. According to one source, students, professional scholars, and other
museums usually do not have to pay fees for museum photographs and
transparencies. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 48. The Gardner Survey,
supra note 73, at 12-13, shows that while some museums make no charges to
scholars and non-profit organizations for the rental of 4" x 5" and 8" x 10"
transparencies, the average charge for renting an 8" x 10" was $62.53 for
scholars (in contrast to $79.30 for commercial enterprises). See id. at 12. If
reproduction rights were included, the average rental Increased to $83.13 for
scholars and $144.58 for commercial entities. See id. at 13. Most institutions
charged only $3.50 to purchase a slide without regard to the purchaser's
commercial, non-profit, or scholar status. See id. at 5.
83. See Walsh, supra note 4, at 370. Walsh, who concedes he is not an
attorney, suggests that the past reluctance of museums to protect these rights
might establish a laches defense if museums ever do file suit. See id. at 369-70.
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most common infringers were "within the interdependent art
world family of art historians, art journals, art publishers,
college and university libraries, and other museums. "84
Permitting scholarly use was considered a service to the world
of knowledge about art.8 5 Therefore, museums have preferred
to overlook all but the most flagrant infringements.8 6
The climate has changed. In the past, scholarly use of
reproductions was thought to have the potential to enhance
the monetary value of the works reproduced, but the booming
market for images of fine art has changed the perspective of
museums, which now fear such uses may diminish the value
of the actual objects or their photographs of them. 87 As a
result, museums are tightening access to images, and
challenges to their copyright claims are more likely. Indeed,
publishers and scholars have begun to question the right of
museums to control public-domain works and restrict the
uses of their reproductions. 88 The time has come to scrutinize
As this article went to press, Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F.
Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) was decided. In that case, a British firm that
markets photographic and digital reproductions of public-domain artworks sued
Corel Corporation for infringement of its copyrights in the reproductions. See id.
at 423. This is the first reported case on the specific issue analyzed in this
article. Applying British law, Judge Kaplan found that the reproductions were
not sufficiently original to be copyrighted. See id. at 426-27. The logic of the
court is similar to that in this article. See infra, Part IV. B.
84. Id. at 370. These are also the users for whom fees are generally waived.
See Kirkpatrick, supra note 46, at 49. Therefore, museums may view their
unauthorized uses as situations of "no harm, no foul."
85. See Baron, supra note 24, at 56.
86. See Walsh, supra note 4, at 370.
87. See Baron, supra note 24, at 56.
88. See id. at 57-59, 61-62; see also Walsh, supra note 4, at 362; Sundt,
supra note 24, at 304-05. There are two closely related issues here-the right of
access to public-domain images and the right to use that access as one pleases.
As to the first, "[wlithin the nonprofit arts world and the legal community,
Corbis's interpretation of copyright law has set off some alarm bells .... [Slome
worry that Corbis may radically reduce access to images in the public domain by
transforming them into digital images and claiming a copyright where none
previously existed." Lusaka, supra note 36, at 77. As to the second, one art
historian questions whether:
museums have the right to control the manner in which works of art are
reproduced? Copyright law gives this right first to the artist and the
artist's heirs, and then, when copyright has expired to the public as a
whole. Just as the public has the right to produce terrible (as well as
excellent) performances of Shakespeare at will, so it should have the
right to use and misuse the works of Rembrandt, Raphael, and Monet.
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these copyrights, which thwart the public-domain principle by
blocking scholarly and popular access to valued and valuable
public images and by restricting how public-domain images
may be used.
II
What is an Original Art Reproduction?
A. The Originality Requirement
The validity of the copyrights asserted in photographic
and digital reproductions hangs on the prerequisite essential
to all copyright protection: their originality. 89 Only "original
works of authorship" receive copyright protection, 90 and so a
work must contain some measure of originality to be protected
under copyright law. Originality is a constitutional
requirement implicit in the idea of "authorship" in the
Copyright Clause, 9 1 but it is generally understood that a very
low threshold of originality is required. A standard
formulation is that "[o]riginality means only that the work
owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently created,
and not copied from other works."92 Although the prohibition
against copyrights for copied works seems to disqualify the
museum photograph of a Rembrandt or a Turner, the
Copyright Act does recognize "art reproductions" as a type of
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work" that may be
copyrighted.
93
When a copyright dispute arises over an art reproduction,
the court must discern an oxymoron: an original
reproduction. The first step to solving this conundrum is to
understand the limited scope of copyright protection granted
art reproductions. The Copyright Act protects only those
elements of the reproduction that are not copied from the
Walsh, supra note 4, at 370-71.
89. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at §2.01.
90. 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1994).
91. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at §1.06[A]. The originality
requirement is also explicitly stated in the Act. 17 U.S.C. §102(a).
92. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at §2.01[A] (citing Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d. Cir. 1951)).
93. 17 U.S.C. §101, §102(a)(5) (1994).
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underlying work. 94 The unprotected, copied elements, after all,
"owe their origin to" the artist whose work has been
reproduced. Moreover, by limiting protection of reproductions
to the uncopied elements, the Copyright Act guards against
the use of copyrights in derivative works to affect the
copyrights in or public-domain status of the underlying
works.95 Therefore, the search for originality begins with a
search for those elements that have not been copied-the
parts that "owe their origin to" the reproducer-and is guided
by the policy that protecting the reproduction must not affect
the public-domain status of or copyrights in the first work.
Identifying uncopied elements is not enough, however, to
establish the copyrightability of reproductions; the uncopied
elements must themselves be original, and the standard for
their originality is different from the standard applied to non-
derivative works.
96
To determine whether the photographic or digital
reproduction is just a copy of another work or is a privileged
and protectible re-creation, an art reproduction that contains
some sufficiently original contribution not present in the
underlying work, 97 courts generally require a copyright
claimant to demonstrate a substantial, distinguishable
variation between the reproduction and the original artwork.
98
An alternate standard, which ignores the need to find the
protectible, uncopied contributions, determines originality
based on the reproducer's independent and artistic skill,
labor, and judgment.99 Reproducers relying on this standard
have not, however, been very successful in court. The only art
94. 17 U.S.C. §103(b) (1994).
95. The Copyright Act provides:
The copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work . . . and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,
ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material.
17 U.S.C. §103(b).
96. Courts analyze originality differently for different subject matter. See
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, §2.2.1, 64-65 (1989). This fact is sometimes
overlooked in the literature on originality of reproductions.
97. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at §2.08[C][2].
98. See infra text accompanying notes 100-136, 162-177, 183-186, 205-208.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 137-142, 178-180, 190-200.
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reproduction a court has found original under this test was
the sculpture that inspired application of the rule in a visual-
arts context. The following sections look first at early
articulations of both tests and then examine their later more
stringent and sometimes overlapping applications.
B. Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts: The Distinguishable-
Variation Test
"While a copy of something in the public domain will not,
if it be merely a copy, support a copyright, a distinguishable
variation will, even though it present the same theme," ruled
the Second Circuit with little discussion in a 1927 opinion. 100
The first thorough examination of the "distinguishable
variation" test came twenty years later in the Southern
District of New York's opinion, Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine
Arts,' 0 followed by the Second Circuit's affirmance. 10 2 The
district court explained and applied the test, but the appeal
challenged and the Second Circuit defended the
constitutionality of the low threshold of originality the test
imposed. 0 3 Both opinions, therefore, must be examined to
understand what the test protects and how it might actually
be applied to photographic and digital reproductions. 1
0 4
The plaintiff in Alfred Bell commissioned and copyrighted
eight mezzotint engravings of well-known, public-domain
paintings from the 18th and 19th centuries, including
Gainsborough's Blue Boy and Lawrence's Pinky.10 5 The
defendant produced and sold color lithographs of the
100. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir.
1927).
101. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 74 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
102. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
103. "It is clear, then, that nothing In the Constitution commands that
copyrighted matter be strikingly unique or novel. Accordingly, we were not
ignoring the Constitution when we stated that a 'copy of something in the public
domain' will support a copyright if it is a 'distinguishable variation.'" Id. at 102.
104. Not looking at the cases as a pair leads to some unfair criticism of the
Second Circuit's opinion. See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the
School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 133-135 (1991).
105. Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 974-76, 979. It has been said that
Gainsborough was the "most difficult of painters to translate to the copper."
MALCOLM C. SALAMAN, OLD ENGLISH MEZZOTINTS 31 (1910). In comparing the
works of different mezzotint engravers, Salaman identifies their varied artistry
and shows how this form of reproduction is itself an art and not mere copying.
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plaintiffs mezzotints.10 6 In response to the plaintiffs suit for
copyright infringement, the defendant argued that the
plaintiffs mezzotints lacked sufficient originality to satisfy the
Copyright Clause and so were not entitled to copyright
protection. 
107
Judge Smith, writing for the district court, began his
analysis by isolating the obviously copied aspects of the
mezzotints. He observed that the mezzotints "attempted
faithfully to reproduce . .. the basic idea, arrangement, and
color scheme" of the paintings; these elements originated with
the painters and not with the engravers. 108 In other words, the
composition of the mezzotints owed its origin to the painters
and could not be copyrighted by the artists who reproduced
the paintings as mezzotints. '
09
The fact that the "mezzotint method lends itself to a fairly
realistic reproduction of oil paintings" 110 did not, however,
preclude a finding of originality. 1 ' As Judge Smith explained,
"Congress in the Act, and the copyright office in the
regulations adopted pursuant to the Act, recognize that there
may be in reproductions of works of art an artistic element
distinct from that of the original work of art."t1 2 That distinct
artistic element satisfies the constitutional requirement of
originality, and it is that distinct artistic element the law
protects.113 Therefore, the court inquired "whether the
'interpretation' of the original obtained by the mezzotinter in
his management of the depth and form of the depression on
106. See Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 974-75, 979.
107. See id. at 975.
108. Id.
109. Judge Smith also observed that mezzotints "make quite a satisfactory
reproduction... preserving the softness of line which is characteristic of the oil
paintings." Id.
110. Id.
111. On appeal, the defendant argued that reproductions of public-domain
works should not be copyrightable. The Second Circuit found this argument
"untenable." Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 104.
112. Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 975-76. This statement reflects the
regulations of the Copyright Office at the time Bell was decided. "Reproductions
of works of art. This term refers to such reproductions (engravings, woodcuts,
etchings, casts, etc.) as contain in themselves an artistic element distinct from
that of the original work of art which has been reproduced." R. Bowker,
COPYRIGHT 223-24 (1912).
113. See Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 976.
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his plate is such an element."1 14 The court was able to detect
certain distinctive differences between the mezzotints and the
paintings (facial expressions, treatment of a flower, of a bun of
hair)115 but did not base its ruling on these specific
differences. Observing that a mezzotint does not provide "a
photographic copy of [a] painting . . . exact in all its details"
and that "[nlo two engravers can produce identical
interpretations of the same . . . painting," 116 the court
concluded:
What is original with the engraver is the handling of the
painting in another medium to bring out the engraver's
conception of the total effect of the old master. The engraver
is not trying to alter or improve on the old master. He is
trying to express in another medium what the original artist
expressed in oils on canvas.
It is only this treatment in another medium which is
original, but it is a distinguishable effect which can itself be
copied by photography. The engraver's contribution to the
world's art is indeed modest, but it is his own and should be
protected. 117
The Second Circuit also concluded that the mezzotints
contained "substantial departures."1 8  In a footnoted
quotation, the court showed more vividly the originality found
in transforming a painting to a mezzotint:
The engraver produces his effects by the management of
light and shade, or, as the term of his art expresses it, the
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 975.
117. Id. at 976.
Britain enacted the first copyright protection for engravers in 1735 with "An
Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of Designing, Engraving, Etching, Etc.,"
which is more commonly known as the Hogarth Act, because the protests of the
satirical engraver William Hogarth against piracy of his work were largely
responsible for passage of the law. WAx, supra note 8, at 41. This law applied
only to plates of original design, not to reproductions. See id. at 67. However, in
1776 the copyright laws were amended to include engravings that reproduced
originals. See id. In the eighteenth century, engravers were unlikely to take
advantage of the statute to file suit for copyright infringement, partly because of
"a general disdain for lawyers in the population at large." Id. at 68. Also, suits
were too expensive in light of the low damages likely to be recovered; the copies
were often so inferior they did not really compete with the originals; pirated
prints were sometimes seen as tributes to the originals, which raised their value;
and the pirating practice provided employment for many mezzotint engravers.
See id.
118. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105.
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chiarooscuro [sic]. The due degrees of light and shade are
produced by different lines and dots; he who is the engraver
must decide on the choice of the different lines or dots for
himself, and on his choice depends the success of his
print. 119
The distinguishable-variation test acknowledges that it
seeks originality in a copy and acknowledges that most
elements of the reproduction will not be copyrightable
because they owe their origin to the artist who created the
original. The test also recognizes that sometimes
reproductions are more than mere copies and that the public
has gained more than an opportunity for wider distribution
and use of the content of the original; sometimes the public
has gained distinct, new contributions of sufficient value to
merit copyright protection. That is why the mezzotints, which
the evidence indicated "were not intended to, and did not,
imitate the paintings they reproduced" 120 were copyrightable.
While serving the special situation of the art reproduction
with a standard for originality not applied to any other
potentially copyrightable work, the distinguishable-variation
test remains faithful to the basic question of whether the
material sought to be copyrighted "owes its origin to" its
maker. The test first separates the compositional elements
that owe their origin to the original artist from the new
elements, variations that are candidates for protection. The
test then requires those variations to be more than merely
trivial. It requires them to be "distinct artistic elements," so
that copyright protection is bestowed only on those variations
that, in the context of a substantially copied work, deserve
protection. The court looks for what Judge Frank of the
Second Circuit described as a contribution from the author,
119. Id. at 104 n.22, (citing COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTs 46 (7th ed.
1936)). A reader curious about the mezzotint process and its history should read
WAX, supra note 8.
120. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 104-05. One scholar is "agog" to read this
assertion in the opinion. "This sentence can barely be read with a straight face.
Its final word alone confounds its claim." Wiley, supra note 104, at 135.
Mezzotint engravers have, however, traditionally viewed themselves as artists
creating their own artistic works and not as mere copyists. When photographic
reproduction gave artists a new means of reproducing their work, artists "were
often grateful to be liberated from having to grapple with engravers'
interpretations and temperaments." WAX, supra note 8, at 138. For a better
perspective on this seemingly contradictory statement, see generally, SALAMAN,
supra note 105, and WAX, supra note 8.
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"something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something
recognizably 'his own."' 12 1 Changes in color 122 and changes
motivated by greater ease in mass production 123 have been
found too trivial to merit protection. In addition, changes that
result from the necessities and inevitabilities of the method of
reproduction will also be treated as trivial, because they do
not owe their origin to the reproducer but to the method. Only
the truly new contributions, that also owe their origin to the
reproducing artist and are not an inevitable result of the
medium of the reproduction, can be copyrighted. 124
Mezzotints that reproduce paintings contain visible
differences compared to the paintings; lines, dots, and
chiaroscuro, not employed in the original, appear in the
mezzotint to evoke the softness of the brushstrokes. The
particular choices of lines, dots, and chiaroscuro in any
mezzotint are not a necessary result of the transformation of
the painting to a mezzotint because, as Judge Smith observed,
"[n]o two mezzotint engravers can produce identical
interpretations of the same painting," 125 and as Judge Frank
observed, the engraver chooses the lines or dots to create the
distinct effect-the particular lines and dots employed owe
their origin to the engraver, not to the process. 126
The district court observed that the distinct mezzotint
effect "can itself be copied by photography." 127 In other words,
if a photograph is taken of a painting and of the mezzotint, the
painting and the mezzotint reproduction will be
distinguishable from each other in the photographs. If,
however, a photograph is taken of a painting, and a
photograph is taken of the photographic reproduction, the
photograph of the painting and the photograph of the
photograph of the painting will not be distinguishable. 128 This
121. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03.
122. See Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
123. See L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976).
124. Originality is a test for new contributions. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 18, at §8.62.
125. Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 975.
126. See supra text accompanying note 119.
127. Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 976.
128. Gregg Oppenheimer's gloss on this passage is:
The court's implication was that if the infringers had instead chosen a
medium, such as pen and ink, by which the 'total visual effect' of the oil
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suggests that differences that cannot be captured by
photography are not sufficiently substantial to merit copyright
protection. 1
29
Some commentators have interpreted the two opinions in
this case to establish a test that looks for and rewards skill
and labor, t30 and it is true that some of the language in both
opinions appears to permit such an interpretation. Both the
district court and the Second Circuit commented on the
expertise and craft necessary to create the mezzotints. The
district court noted, for example, that "[ilt is a tedious process
requiring skill and patience and is, therefore, rather expensive
compared with modern color photographic processes."' 3 1 After
a lengthy description of the mezzotint process, the court
further explained:
The work of the engraver upon the plate requires the
individual conception, judgment and execution by the
engraver on the depth and shape of the depressions in the
plate to be made by the scraping process in order to produce'
in this other medium the engraver's concept of the effect of
the oil painting .... This would appear to be sufficient to
meet the requirement of some originality to entitle a work to
the protection of the copyright law. 
132
The Second Circuit's finding that the mezzotint "amply met
the standards imposed by the Constitution and the statute" is
supported by a footnoted quotation that says, in part, "[an
engraver's] work may still be original in the sense that he has
employed skill and judgment in its production."'
33
paintings could be copied from the mezzotints, without copying the
engravers' treatment in the mezzotint medium, then there would have
been no infringement.
Gregg Oppenheimer, student author, Originality in Art Reproductions: "Variations
in Search of a Theme," 27 COPYRIGHT SYMP. 207, 235 (1982). See also Anthony
Hughes, Authority, Authenticity and Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Case of
Michelangelo, in SCULPTURE AND ITS REPRODUCTIONS, 29, 40 (Anthony Hughes &
Eric Ranfft, eds., 1997). The "reliability [of photographic reproductions] may be
checked precisely by setting photographs of copy and original side by side."
129. This idea is explored in Judge Posner's decision in Gracen v. 'Bradford
Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983), which is discussed infra in Part
II.D.2.b. of this article.
130. See, e.g., DARRABY, supra note 18, at §7.03[l][b], §7.05[1][b][ii][A].
131. Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 975.
132. Id.
133. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 104 n.22 (quoting COPINGER, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS 46 (7th ed. 1936)).
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What, then, is the importance of the reproducer's skill and
judgment in a test the court declared was satisfied by "a
distinct artistic element"? Despite both courts' references to
skill and effort, the distinguishable-variation test cannot be
treated as demanding either, and the test should be applied in
a result-oriented fashion. After all, the Second Circuit decision
opines that variations caused by poor eyesight or muscle
spasms, neither of which demonstrates skill or effort, would
be sufficiently distinguishable to merit copyright protection.
134
Instead, these references to skill are in part the inevitable
result of the difficulty of explaining how the mezzotints
contain something new without explaining how that
something new was achieved. In addition, and more
importantly, the focus on process demonstrates how the
visible difference between painting and mezzotint-the
distinguishable variation-is something that "owes its origin"
to the mezzotint artist himself, rather than being a necessary
incident of making a "mere copy" in another medium. 135 The
attention to skill and effort in Bell highlights the requirement
that the distinguishable variation be the product of the
reproducer's independent efforts.136 It does not make skill and
effort the primary questions or supplant the primary question:
does the reproduced work contain a distinguishable variation
from the original?
134. Id. at 105. This statement has been characterized as "overblown dicta."
Brown, supra note 77, at 6. Another writer has suggested, however, that Judge
Frank "was no doubt persuaded by the enormous proof problems that would be
created if inadvertent elements of works of art were excluded from copyright
protection." Oppenheimer, supra note 128, at 230. He cites Chamberlain v. Uris
Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 n.4 (2d Cir. 1945): "It is not easy to ascertain
what is intended and what inadvertent in the work of genius: That a man is
color-blind may make him a master of black and white art: a painter's unique
distortions, hailed as a sign of his genius, may be due to defective muscles."
Oppenheimer concludes that Frank is correct that inadvertence does not bar
copyright, because copyright law seeks not only to encourage production of
artworks but also to encourage their creators to make them available to the
public, which artists would be less likely to do if inadvertent contributions were
unprotected. Oppenheimer, supra note 128, at 230-31.
135. That is explicitly why the Second Circuit provided a description of the
mezzotint process: 'They 'originated with those who make them."' Alfred Bell,
191 F.2d at 104.
136. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at §2.01[B].
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C. Alva Studios v. Winninger. The Skill, Labor, and Judgment
Test
Twelve years after Bell v. Catalda, Chief Judge Ryan of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York announced an alternate standard that permitted a
finding of originality when the artist created a work through
his "own skill, labor and judgment without directly copying or
evasively imitating the work of another."137 Through an
exclusive arrangement with the Department of Fine Arts of the
Carnegie Institute, which owned an original casting of
Auguste Rodin's Hand of God, the plaintiff reproduced the 37-
inch bronze public-domain sculpture in a reduced size of 181/2
inches. 138 The defendant subsequently marketed a reduced-
scale Hand of God, which the plaintiff claimed had been
directly copied from its reproduction and, therefore, infringed
its copyright. 139 On the threshold issue of the validity of its
copyright, the plaintiff argued that the reproduction was
original because:
These reproductions are made through the use of special
techniques, skills and judgment developed by plaintiff and
are hand finished to duplicate as closely as possible the
exact shape, patina, color and texture of the original....
Rodin's Hand of God is one of the most intricate pieces of
sculpture ever created. Innumerable planes, lines and
geometric patterns are all interdependent in this multi-
137. Alva Studios v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Some
scholars contend that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Feist
Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), "seems to spell the
end of Alva Studios as viable doctrine." Howard A. Abrams, Copyright and
Legislation: The Kastenmeier Years, 55 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 3, 42
(1992). Although the Feist decision declared that extensive labor is not enough to
satisfy the originality requirement, the labor test in Alva Studios is not merely an
effort test, but a test that also requires skill, usually interpreted as artistic skill,
and so Feist does not seem to answer the question of whether Alva Studios
continues to be a proper test for originality in art reproductions. See Jeanne
English Sullivan, Copyright for Visual Art in the Digital Age: A Modem Adventure
in Woderland, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 563, 620 (1996).
138. See id. at 267.
139. See id. at 266-67. The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City also
owned an original of the sculpture, and the defendant claimed that his allegedly
infringing reproduction had been copied from the original at the Metropolitan
and not from the plaintiffs replica. See id. at 267. The Metropolitan original is
marble. JOHN L. TANCOCK, THE SCULPTURE OF AUGUSTE RODIN 623 (1976).
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dimensional work. In reduction they all have to be carried
over with supreme exactness into smaller scale. 
140
The plaintiff alleged that reducing the sculpture in size
required many hours by an "extremely skilled sculptor"
working directly in front of the original and that any small
discrepancy would change the overall appearance of the
reproduction.1 4 1 The court was persuaded and held that the
plaintiff had met the burden of showing originality by
"produc[ing] a scale reduction of a great work with
exactitude."1
42
Alva Studios is a troublesome case-both because of
ambiguities and unanswered questions within the opinion
and because "skill, labor, and judgment" is an inappropriate
standard for evaluating originality in art reproductions. The
Alva Studios opinion does not establish criteria or guidelines
for determining when the requisite skill, labor, and judgment
have been met. Moreover, the court bolstered its conclusion
that the replica was original with additional comments that
raise but do not answer questions about whether these
additional considerations were essential to the court's holding
and thus to its definition of originality generally. The court
wrote, "[tihe rear side of the original base is open; that of the
plaintiffs work is closed. We find that this difference when
coupled with the skilled scaled sculpture is itself creative."
143
By pointing out a distinguishable variation while applying a
skill, labor, and judgment test, the Alva Studios court
muddied the waters, and contradictory decisions have flowed
from those muddy waters. One oft-cited opinion, emphasizing
the exactitude of the Rodin replica, found a reproduction
failed to satisfy the Alva Studios test for originality because
the work was not faithful to the original. 144 Yet another
140. Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 266. Photographs of this sculpture can be
seen in TANCOCK, supra note 139, at 624-25. It depicts an uplifted hand cradling
the curled bodies of Adam and Eve.
141. Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 266.
142. Id. at 267.
143. Id. In addition, the plaintiff may simply have conformed the replica to
other originals of Hand of God with closed bases, rather than making a creative
decision to close the base. A Rodin scholar observes that the Carnegie Institute
casting, because it is "open in the back, must have been cast from a different
marble than that in the Rodin Museum. See TANCOCK, supra note 139, at
623.
144. See L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976).
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eminent opinion, emphasizing the court's mention of the
variation in the sculpture base, found a reproduction was not
original under Alva Studios because the work was too faithful
to the original. 145 If Alva Studios really establishes an effort-
focused test, faithfulness or unfaithfulness of the
reproduction to the original should be irrelevant to whether
the test is met. By explaining that originality came from
reducing the sculpture "with exactitude" and also from
variations in the base, the court injected unnecessary issues
and sent conflicting messages about how to resolve them.
The exactitude "requirement" is best understood as a
prerequisite to rather than an element of the skill, labor, and
judgment test. Implicit in the court's creation of an alternate
test for originality is the conclusion that the plaintiffs replica
of Hand of God would not satisfy the distinguishable-variation
test. The value of the reproduction was its exactitude, the fact
that it copied the "exact shape, patina, color and texture of
the original" and that despite reducing the size, it repeated
"with supreme exactness" all the "[ilnnumerable planes, lines
and geometric patterns."' 46 The point was to have no variation
other than the reduction in size, which could hardly be
described as a distinct artistic element. 147 Thus, when the
reproduction has aimed for exactitude and is too exact to
satisfy the distinguishable-variation test, the alternate test of
skill, labor, and judgment may be applied. If, however, the
reproducer's goal was not exactitude but variation, and the
work did not contribute any distinguishable variations to the
world of visual arts, the lack of a distinguishable variation
should be fatal to the claim of originality, and resorting to the
alternate test should be prohibited. Variation, therefore,
cannot be an element of the test, despite the court's
unfortunate reference to it.
To justify its decision further, the court cited the plaintiffs
relationship with the Carnegie Institute Department of Fine
Arts, which owned the original bronze. 148 This attempt to
support the ruling also raises more questions than it
145. See Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 839 (1987).
146. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 112 & 113 and accompanying text.
148. See Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 267.
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answers. 14 9 The plaintiff created the replica under the
authority of the Carnegie Institute and in close collaboration
with the curatorial staff, who monitored the quality and detail
of the plaintiffs scaled reproduction. 150 The plaintiff alone was
granted access to the original, and the plaintiff alone was
allowed to work directly from the original. ' This approval by
the Carnegie Institute, as "experts in the field," was "extremely
persuasive that the plaintiffs copyrighted work is in itself a
work of art which bears the stamp of originality and of
skill."' 152 Unfortunately, the court did not explain why the
Carnegie Institute imprimatur demonstrated originality and
skill. Perhaps the court meant only that the conduct of the
Carnegie Institute in giving the plaintiff special access,
overseeing his work, and allowing him to place its label on his
work was akin to expert evidence that plaintiff had indeed
employed skill, labor, and judgment, because otherwise the
Institute would not have granted such privileges and
approval. 153 But perhaps the court meant something more.
The court may have believed that a sculptor working to
recreate a three-dimensional subject, whether that subject is
a human being or another sculpture, is doing what an artist
does, rather than what a mere copyist does, and the grant of
access by the Carnegie Institute was proof that the Hand of
God reproduction was not just the work of a copyist but the
work of an original artist. Whatever the court's reasons, the
court may have made too much of the approval of the
Carnegie Institute, which, after all, received royalties on the
sale of Hand of God replicas. 154 The Institute's authentication
149. In a subsequent case regarding the originality of lithographic
reproductions, the court rejected an argument that the lithographs satisfied the
Alva Studios standard and cited among its reasons the fact that there had been
no "accrediting of the reproduction by an expert" as in Alva Studios. See Heam,
664 F. Supp. at 839.
150. See Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 266.
151. See id. at 267.
152. Id.
153. "Expert testimony has bootstrapped findings of originality," writes one
scholar describing the role of the curators' testimony in this case. DARRABY,
supra note 18, at §7.02[21[a]. This expert testimony had to be to some degree
self-serving, because the defendant's reproductions threatened the museum's
profits from the royalty agreement with the plaintiff in whose favor the curators
testified. See Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 266.
154. See Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 266.
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most likely made the reproductions more marketable and
increased those royalties.
In addition to being poorly explained in this instance, the
standard is generally a poor tool for discerning the original art
reproduction. A significant flaw in testing the originality of art
reproductions by a skill, labor, and judgment standard is that
most art reproductions, unless made by a photocopy machine,
do require skill, labor, and judgment, and so the standard is
not a meaningful way to distinguish art reproductions that
deserve protection from those that do not. Although a skill
test identifies the plagiarized, unprotectible literary work, the
test "fails to differentiate between the product of original
intellectual conception and the product of 'actual copying'"
when applied to replicas of visual art.155 In other words, it
fails to identify the "mere copies" that copyright law excludes
from protection. Copyright law treads cautiously in granting
protection to art reproductions, because they are essentially
155. Oppenheimer, supra note 128, at 226.
While the "skill and judgment" test may function well in testing the
originality of literary works, it is considerably less useful in the field of
visual arts. The copyright in a literary work does not protect the physical
appearance of the work-pages of a book, printed with groups of letters.
These are but symbols. It is only the train of creative expression
represented by those symbols which is granted copyright protection. The
fact that a copy of a literary work does not physically resemble the
original is irrelevant. So long as the author's choice and arrangement of
symbols is maintained, the protected portion of the work will have been
accurately copied. Since skill and judgment are necessary in the choice
and arrangement of words in a literary work, but not in the production
of an accurate copy, they serve as accurate benchmarks of originality in
literature.
However, the copyright in a work of art, unlike the literary copyright,
does protect its physical appearance. The brush strokes of pigment on
canvas are not symbolic-they are the work itself. Artistic skill and
judgment are required of the artist not only in his choice and
arrangement of the features of his work (his original intellectual concept)
but also in the transformation of his ideas into tangible form. Here, in
contrast to the literary field, the exercise of skill and judgment is not the
antithesis of "slavish copying." Indeed, such skill is often a prerequisite
for the production of an accurate copy.
Thus, the use of the "skill and judgment" test to determine originality
in the context of the visual arts is inappropriate; it fails to differentiate
between the product of original intellectual conception and the product
of "actual copying." In fact, since in the visual arts "the closer to exact
duplication of the original, the greater skill demonstrated," this test may
yield exactly the opposite of the desired result.
Id. at 225-27.
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copies, and protects only the new contributions within the
copies. The skill test disregards this necessary caution and
theoretically could, because of the skill necessary in any
successful reproduction, bestow copyright too freely in this
area where copyright is intended to be limited.
In the context of art reproductions, the search for a
distinguishable variation makes more sense than an
assessment of skill, labor, and judgment. A reproduction
containing a distinguishable variation gives the public
something new to be delighted or enlightened by, and so the
law protects the new variation on the old theme. Skill, labor,
and judgment, as a test limited in application to exact
replicas, produce no new images for the public's benefit that
were not in the world already. All the skillfully-made exact
replica contributes is an accurate copy of an original too rare
and expensive for the consumer to obtain or afford. Through
reproduction, a unique art object becomes a distributable
commodity.
The critical question, then, is whether copyright law is
intended to stimulate the commodification of existing art
images, and the answer is that it is not. Copyright law
encourages new contributions to the visual arts, not the
dissemination of old ones. To use the copyright monopoly to
reward and thus encourage skill in exact reproductions
confuses the roles of copyright and the art marketplace. When
the subject is visual art, copyright law cares only whether the
contribution is new, not whether skill was required in making
it. The art marketplace, not copyright law, is the arbiter of
artistic skill, labor, and judgment, and with the exception of
this test, the law has been careful to preserve the
distinction. 156 When a visual artist makes a new contribution,
regardless of the skill involved, the law will bar others from
profiting from that contribution. How much the artist actually
profits will depend upon the value the art marketplace puts
on the work, and such value depends upon the perception in
the market of the skill, labor, and judgment involved in
creating the work. If the public does not value the work, does
156. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph., 188 U.S. 239 (1903);
DARRABY, supra note 18, at §7.02[2][c].
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not find sufficient skill, labor, and judgment, the copyright-
protected artist will not profit.
Similarly, when a reproducer creates a work that
contributes a new element to the copied image, copyright law
will bar others from profiting from the new contribution. How
much the reproducer actually profits will depend not only
upon the value the marketplace puts on the contribution for
its skill and creativity but also upon the value it places on the
reproduction as a whole, a value influenced by factors not
protected by the copyright: the skill, labor, and judgment of
the copied portions of the reproduction, the appeal of the
copied image, proper pricing, and clever marketing. These
other factors are all the exact replica has to offer, and so it
must depend upon the marketplace for its rewards. A healthy
market for reproductions of popular images will encourage
and reward the creation of skilled copies.
157
The skill test is also incompatible with the narrow
copyright in art reproductions, which protects only the new
contributions to the underlying work. Isolating the protected
aspects of a reproduction found original under the test for
skill, labor, and judgment is impossible. The "skill" of the
piece cannot be isolated as a protectible element, and a work
protected solely for its skill would lack identifiable, protectible
new distinctions. This makes it difficult to determine when a
skilled, exact reproduction has been infringed and can give
the first reproducer a monopoly on the image accurately
reproduced.
A hint of the potential problems appears in Alva Studios.
The defendants claimed they had not copied the plaintiffs
reproduction but had instead exercised their right to use
works in the public domain by copying another original
version of Hand of God owned by the Metropolitan
Museum. 158 Assuming arguendo that the defendants' claim of
copying another original was true, but difficult to prove,
reveals the danger in granting copyright protection to exact,
skillfully-made reproductions. The first reproducer of the
public-domain image can falsely but convincingly argue that
the second reproducer did not copy the original but rather
157. See supra notes 25-38, and accompanying text.
158. See Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp at 268.
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copied and infringed the first reproduction. This allows the
first reproducer to monopolize the right to copy that work.
Without distinct differences between the competing
reproductions, the second reproducer may be unable to prove
that the work was copied from the original rather than from
plaintiffs prior reproduction.
If the only real value contributed by the exact replica is
the commodification of a rare art piece, then competition in
the market for these commodities should be encouraged by
denying copyrights to exact reproductions rather than
discouraged by granting a monopoly to the first reproducer.
159
If the first reproducer has special techniques that produce a
more satisfactory result, as the plaintiff claimed in Alva
Studios, the market will reward that technique-more of that
reproducer's works will sell or they will sell at a higher price.
To prevent granting copyright protection too liberally
under the skill, labor and judgment test, courts have defined
"skill, labor, and judgment" to require "true artistic skill,"16 0 a
definition that contradicts courts' traditional reluctance to
determine whether a work is art or not. 161 Using this standard
leaves courts with the unclear and difficult task of discerning
when the skill of the reproducer has surpassed the skill
required of most reproducers, who are not granted copyright
without contributing distinguishable variations, and requires
courts to recognize artistic skill without declaring what is and
is not art.
159. That is one of the goals of the public-domain principle: to allow the
consuming public "to benefit from competition of producers who may bring out
more varied editions at cheaper prices than if exclusive control still existed over
the work involved." Krasilovsky, supra note 23, at 213.
Professors Merryman and Elsen advocate the prohibition of exact
reproductions of sculpture because of how easily they support fraud. Indeed,
Rodin replicas, produced by Nelson Rockefeller's company, the Rockefeller
Collection, through a process called surmoulage, are cited as a perfect example
of the problem. Only the Mus6e Rodin can authorize Rodin reproductions
regarded as original in the art world. Bronze casts from the Rockefeller
Collection were to the ordinary eye indistinguishable from casts authorized by
the Mus4e Rodin, and a Rockefeller reproduction was offered for sale as an
original at a Paris gallery near the Musde. See Albert E. Elsen, John Merryman:
Founding the Field of Art Law, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1086, 1091 (1987); MERRYMAN &
ELSEN, supra note 11, at 185.
160. L. Batlin & Son. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).
161. See generally Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239; DARRABY, supra note 18, at
§7.02[21[c].
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D. The Tests Overlap and Become More Stringent
1. L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder: The Turning Point
In 1976, L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder presented the Second
Circuit with the bicentennial issue of the originality of plastic
Uncle Sam banks based on iron mechanical banks in the
public domain, 162 and the opinion is a turning-point in the
law examining originality in reproductions. Relying on Batlin,
subsequent decisions appear to have set higher standards.
Applying the distinguishable-variation test, courts have
required a substantial, not merely distinguishable
variation. 16 3 Applying a skill, labor, and judgment test, they
have demanded a high degree of artistic skill to establish
originality. 164
The plastic reproductions were undeniably
distinguishable from the iron public-domain originals. In
addition to being constructed in a different medium, the
reproductions were shorter, and anatomical proportions,
clothing designs, placement of the umbrella, and shape and
texture of the satchel were different. 16 5 The eagle in the
reproductions carried leaves, and the public-domain originals
carried arrows. 166 On applying the variation test, however, the
court required the copyright claimant to demonstrate more
than a distinguishable variation to defend his copyright and
found that the variations in the plastic bank were merely
"trivial" and not substantial. 167
One aspect of this holding that has troubled
commentators since, and troubled the dissent then, was the
majority's reasoning that the changes were trivial because the
162. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 488.
163. See Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); See also Sherry
Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Florida Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985).
164. See Batlin, 536 F.2d at 492; see also Heam, 664 F.Supp. at 836.
165. See Batlin, 536 F.2d at 489.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 492. The court believed that to find originality in the plastic
bank would be to abandon even the most minimal requirement of originality.
"Many of these differences," the court wrote, "are not perceptible to the casual
observer." Id. at 489. The court appears to confuse the test of substantial
similarity, used for determining whether one work infringes upon another, with
the test of distinguishable variation, used to determine whether a reproduction
is sufficiently different from an original to merit copyright protection.
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manufacturer's motives for those changes were greater ease
and lower expense in reproducing the bank in the plastic
medium, rather than the manufacturer's desire to leave his
creative imprint on the bank. 168 The court's inquiry into
artistic motive is best reconciled with the result-focused
distinguishable variation test by recalling that to be original a
reproduction must not be a mere mechanical copy and must
contain a distinct artistic element. 169 Only the distinct artistic
elements receive copyright protection, so once distinct
elements are isolated, they must be examined for sufficient
originality to deserve that protection. The work as a whole is
not granted copyright upon the mere showing of variation.
170
The Batlin court found that "a minimal element of creativity
over and above the requirement of independent effort" was
implicit in the requirement of substantial variation and the
prohibition of mechanical copying. 17 1 The court concluded
that the distinct elements in the bank were merely mechanical
rather than artistic differences; this conclusion was supported
by the fact that these differences were prompted by the
mechanical concern of how to make the banks more easily
and cheaply. 172
The Batlin opinion is particularly helpful in understanding
when a change in artistic medium will and will not fulfill the
168. The three-judge dissent pointed out that, "[als noted in Alfred Bell, even
an inadvertent variation can form the basis of a valid copyright. After the fact
speculation as to whether Snyder made changes for aesthetic or functional
reasons should not be the basis of decision." Id. at 493 (citations omitted).
See Oppenheimer, supra note 128, at 231-32; Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking
Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 845, 852, 862-67 (1993). Professors
Merryman and Elsen, however, concur with the majority. MERRYMAN & ELSEN,
supra note 11, at 185.
169. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 973, 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
170. See also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying discussion.
171. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490 (citing M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §10.2,
at 36 (1975)).
172. See id. at 492. Similar reasoning defeated a copyright claim in foam hats
resembling the crown of the Statue of Liberty. The plaintiff had argued that its
hat was original because its spikes were uniform in shape and size, whereas the
spikes on Miss Liberty's crown were not uniform. Citing Batlin, the Southern
District of New York declined "to find artistic originality in a design feature
comprised of elemental symmetry and prompted most probably by the promise
of convenience in manufacture." Past Pluto Prods. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp 1435,
1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
[VOL. 21:55
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND DIGITAL REPRODUCTIONS
originality requirement. Although the treatment of paintings
in the mezzotint medium satisfied originality in Alfred Bell,
173
the court found that the switch from the iron medium to
plastic did not make the plastic bank original. 174 Judge Oakes
reasoned that any time a work is translated into another
medium, trivial variation will necessarily occur, and that such
necessary variation cannot be attributed to the reproducer
who did not independently evolve the medium. 175 Therefore,
the court rejected a per se rule of originality for translation to
another medium. The court noted Professor Nimmer's belief
that protecting the variations that occur solely because of a
change in medium produces the "ludicrous result" that the
first person to reproduce a public-domain artwork in a
different medium thereafter obtains a monopoly on the
underlying work in the medium of the reproduction. 176 The
court explained that "Itlo extend copyrightability to minuscule
variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in the
hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and
monopolizing public domain work."
177
The copyright claimant in the plastic bank also tried to
defend his copyright as valid under the Alva Studios test of
"physical skill" or "special training." 178 The court rejected this
expression of the Alva Studios standard and required a
considerably higher degree of skill, which it called "true
artistic skill," to make the reproduction copyrightable under
that test. ' Without explicitly rejecting Alva Studios, the court
held that if there was a point in the copyright law of
reproductions at which sheer artistic skill and effort could be
substituted for the requirement of substantial variation, it had
173. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (1951). See supra Part
II.B. of this article.
174. See Batlin, 536 F.2d at 491.
175. See id.
176. See id. (citing M. NiMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §20.2).
177. Id. at 492. This theme was later picked up by Judge Posner in Gracen v.
Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 205-208. The Second Circuit also returned to this theme in Durham Indus.
v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980), a case involving a dispute over the
originality of plastic, wind-up toys based on Walt Disney characters.




not been reached because the reproduction lacked the
complexity and exactitude involved in Alva Studios. 
180
The Second Circuit also suggested that in reproducing
Hand of God, the plaintiff had provided a public benefit, which
justified the copyright grant. "Rodin's sculpture is . . . so
unique and rare, and adequate public access to it such a
problem that a significant public benefit accrues from its
precise, artistic reproduction. No such benefit can be
imagined to accrue here from the 'knock-off reproduction of
the cast iron Uncle Sam bank."18
2. The Batlin Influence
a. Heam v. Meyer
Michael Patrick Hearn, the plaintiff in Heam v. Meyer,
published The Annotated Wizard of Oz, which included
lithographs that reproduced W.W. Denslow's original, public-
domain illustrations from the first edition of The Wonderful
World of Oz. 182 When Hearn alleged infringement of his
copyright in the lithographs, Judge Leisure of the United
States District for the Southern District of New York found
that Hearn's reproductions were not protectible because they
failed to meet the standard of some substantial, not merely
trivial, variation. 18 3 Hearn first tried to show that substantial
variations existed-he used different shades of green, yellow,
blue, and brown in his reproductions of some of the
illustrations. 184 Influenced by the Second Circuit's decision in
Batlin, the court responded that Hearn "does not claim that
these insignificant variations were created intentionally.
Moreover, plaintiff fails to argue-and this court fails to see-
how these minor variations express the plaintiffs own artistic
viewpoint." 185 The court determined that the variations in
color did not make the illustrations anything more than "mere
slavish copies."'
186
180. See id. at 491-92.
181. Id. at 492.
182. Heam v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
183. See id, at 835-37.




At its most simple, the Heam case instructs that different
color choices are not a sufficiently substantial variation for a
reproduction to be original under copyright law. By noting
that the color changes failed to express an artistic viewpoint,
the opinion may additionally require the copyright claimant to
demonstrate that the reproducer's artistic motivations
inspired the changes, or the requirement of original and
substantial, rather than mechanical, variations will not be
satisfied. This seems to carry Batlin a step further. The Batlin
court found a copy merely mechanical based on evidence of a
mechanical motive, 187 whereas in Heam the court found a
copy merely mechanical based on lack of evidence of an
artistic motive. 188 Because affirmatively demonstrating a
mechanical motive is not the same as failing to show an
artistic motive, the Heam standard seems to be higher; the
court now seems to seek proof that the reproducer was doing
work the of an artist rather than a copyist.
Hearn's second argument in support of originality was
that the difficult, time-consuming, and concentrated artistic
effort that went into recreating the images from the first
edition satisfied the originality requirement. 189 According to
Hearn, the mezzotint process used in Alfred Bell matched
precisely what he did, except that he worked with pen and ink
on acetate instead of working on copper. 190
If Hearn was urging that his effort and skill merited
copyright protection for his lithography, the court's response
should have been to explain that whether Hearn's effort
matched the effort in Alfred Bell was irrelevant, because Alfred
Bell applied the distinguishable-variation test, not the skill,
labor, and judgment test.'9 1 In Alfred Bell, the plaintiffs
translation of oil paintings into mezzotint engravings created
an original effect; the effort involved was not what made the
mezzotints original. 192 Therefore, the fact that Hearn used the
same skills that in Alfred Bell produced a distinguishable
187. L. Batlin & Son. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1976).
188. Heam, 664 F. Supp. at 839.
189. See id. at 838.
190. See id.
191. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 973, 976-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
192. Id.
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variation is irrelevant to whether using these techniques
meets the test of skill, labor, and judgment.
The court did not respond to Hearn's argument in this
way. Rather, the court accepted an interpretation of Alfred
Bell as a skill, labor, and judgment test and then decided
whether Hearn, as he claimed, employed the same quality of
skill and effort as the mezzotint artists.'93 The court found he
did not. 194 In distinguishing Alfred Bell, the court explained
that the finding of originality in Alfred Bell "was based
primarily on plaintiffs conversion of the original art work, oil
paintings done on canvas, to mezzotint engravings. The
district court emphasized that '[w]hat is original . . . is the
handling of the painting in another medium .... It is only
this treatment in another medium which is original .... ."'195
Hearn had made lithographs of lithographs and so his
reproductions did not translate the originals to a new medium
and were not original because without that transformation he
employed a lower level of skill. 1
96
Nor, the court found, was Hearn's effort equivalent to the
great creativity and skill employed to reproduce Hand of
God.'9 7 In that case originality depended upon
more than just the skill of the artisan doing the
reproduction; . . .it took great creativity, as well as skill to
interpret, project and transpose the original Rodin work in
order to create a scale model thereof. In addition, the Court
relied on substantial differences in the appearance between
the reproduction and the original. Finally, the District Court
based its finding of originality on the accrediting of the
reproduction by an expert. 1
98
Apparently, the court found Hearn to be employing merely
the skill of the artisan and not the creativity of an artist. The
uncertainties of the Alva Studios test are evident here.
Because that opinion mentioned substantial differences in the
base of the Rodin replica, the Hearn court inserted a
substantial difference requirement into the skill, labor, and
judgment test, yet in Batlin the court applied Alva Studios as
193. See Hearn, 664 F. Supp. at 838.
194. See id. at 839.
195. Id. (quoting Alfred Bell, 74 F. Supp. at 976.)
196. Id. at 839.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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requiring faithfulness to find the requisite skill in the
reproduction. 199 The district court determined that all Hearn
used was "great effort and time" and that was not enough to
satisfy the Alva Studios test.
20 0
Hearn's final argument was that the public benefit he
provided by making available reproductions of rarely seen
lithographs justified the copyright protection he sought.2 ° '
The court agreed that the original drawings were unavailable
and that the original edition of The Wonderful World of Oz was
difficult to find in libraries, and to some extent, that
defendants and the public had benefited from Hearn's work,
but this in and of itself did not mandate copyright protection.
The court could not permit Hearn to monopolize rights to
reproduce what were concededly rare and public-domain
illustrations and hence restrict public access to them.202
b. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange
Judge Posner's controversial opinion in Gracen v.
Bradford Exchange20 3 considered whether a painting of Judy
Garland portraying Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz,2 ° 4 as a
derivative work based on the movie, sufficiently original to
merit copyright protection.20 s Posner's conclusion that a
painting based on movie stills was not original has been
criticized as too rigid an application of the variation test,
20 6
but the opinion is helpful in its explication of the logic behind
the substantial variation requirement, particularly in a
reproduction case.
But especially as applied to derivative works, the concept of
originality in copyright law has as one would expect a legal
199. L. Batlin & Son. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491, 492 (2d Cir. 1976).
200. See Hearn, 664 F. Supp. at 839.
201. See id. at 840.
202. See id.
203. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1983).
204. (MGM 1939).
205. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304.
206. 'The disease has infected the heartland" begins one author's attack on
the "alarming" operation of the variation rule in the Gracen case and the
"perversity" of the rule in any case. Wiley, supra note 104, at 136. Another
author suggests that Posner "picked up the ball and ran with it. But it is just
possible he ran in the wrong direction." Posner, he believes, "went too far" in
denying copyright to "a flesh-and-blood person who made a portrait." See Brown,
supra note 77, at 5-6.
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rather than aesthetic function-to prevent overlapping
claims. Suppose Artist A produces a reproduction of the
Mona Lisa, a painting in the public domain, which differs
slightly from the original. B also makes a reproduction of the
Mona Lisa. A, who has copyrighted his derivative work, sues
B for infringement. B's defense is that he was copying the
original, not A's reproduction. But if the difference between
the original and A's reproduction is slight, the difference
between A's and B's's reproductions will also be slight, so
that if B had access to A's reproductions the trier of fact will
be hard-pressed to decide whether B was copying A or
copying the Mona Lisa itself.207
Posner conceded that had the plaintiff based her painting
on life, she would have been entitled to a copyright, but a
derivative work must be "substantially different from the
underlying work" to be original. He rejected "[elarlier Second
Circuit cases discussed in Batlin that suggest a more liberal
test," because a too liberal interpretation of originality in
derivative works "would paradoxically inhibit rather than
promote the creation of such works by giving the first creator
a considerable power to interfere with the creation of
subsequent derivative works from the same underlying
work."
20 8
E. Summary of the Originality Tests for Art Reproductions
Today
Any copyright protection in an art reproduction extends
only to new contributions of sufficient originality. If the work
contains nothing new, nothing in the work owes its origin to
the reproducer. Instead the work is a mere copy that owes the
origin of its composition, colors, textures, or other artistic
207. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304 (citation omitted). Some scholars have
suggested that the higher burden in Gracen applies only when the reproduction
is based on a copyrighted work, since the MGM movie was still under copyright
in contrast with Hand of God, which was in the public domain. See, e.g.,
Sullivan, supra note 137, at 620. If this were the case, Judge Posner would not
have been so intellectually sloppy as to use as his example conflicting
reproductions of the Mona Lisa, a public-domain work. The burden imposed in
Gracen cannot be explained by the existence of a copyright in the underlying
work. This mistaken analysis results, too, from trying to reconcile the grant of
copyright in Alva Studios with the denial of copyright in Gracen without
acknowledging that the two cases apply different tests. Gracen does not, like
Alva Studios, apply a skill, labor, and judgment test; it applies a distinguishable-
variation test.
208. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305.
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elements to the artist who created the underlying work.
Therefore, courts will look first for any elements not found in
the original work. If there are no new contributions, the work
will not be protected. If there are variations, the court will test
the copyrightability of the variations by assessing their
originality. Differences that owe their origin to the necessities
and expediencies of the method of reproduction and other
trivial, insubstantial changes will not be protected. Courts
may deny protection to changes that derive from a purely
mechanical motive or do not express "an artistic viewpoint." If
the changes are sufficiently original, the changes-and the
changes only-will be granted copyright protection.
The possibility of an alternate test, never successfully
applied to an art reproduction after the originating case, does
exist. A court might find that "skill, labor, and judgment" in
an art reproduction will satisfy the originality requirement.
This skill is "[miore than just the skill of the artisan,"2 09 and
must be "true artistic skill."21 0 The test is not satisfied simply
by the use of "great effort and time."211 It is strongly arguable,
but not explicitly established by case law, that this test is
available only for reproductions that cannot satisfy a variation
test because they have successfully achieved a goal of
exactitude. It is also strongly arguable that this test is
inappropriate for reproductions of visual arts. Among the
reasons for rejecting the test, the most prominent is the
difficulty in determining what the test protects, which causes
the further difficulty that the test can be used to monopolize
public-domain images and to harass subsequent reproducers
of original images.
III
Are All Photographs Original?
Counsel for Corbis Corporation, the publishing subsidiary
of Microsoft, insists:
It has been accepted for some time that a photograph-and
hence all photography-involves more than a mechanical
process and is subject to copyright protection. Accordingly,
copy photography is protected by the Copyright Act. For
209. Heam, 664 F. Supp. at 839.
210. L. Batlin & Son. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).
211. Heam, 664 F. Supp. at 839.
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example, a photographer who is asked by a museum to take
a detailed photograph of an oil painting . . . can assert
ownership of the copyright of that derivative photograph...
212
Some authority supports this view.2 13 If all photographs
are original works of authorship, all photographic
reproductions would be entitled to copyright protection. The
claimant could simply seek protection for the work as a
photograph rather than as an art reproduction. Therefore, it is
critical to consider whether photographs are, as counsel for
Corbis contends, original per se.
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, a photographer
successfully sued a lithographer for infringing his copyright in
a photograph of Oscar Wilde.2 14 The lithographer appealed,
contending that the copyright protection Congress had
extended to photographs was unconstitutional because "a
photograph being a reproduction, on paper, of the exact
features of some natural object, or of some person, is not a
writing of which the producer is the author."2 15 Justice Miller,
writing for the Supreme Court, rejected this argument and
agreed with the trial court that
the photograph in question . . . is 'a useful, new,
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that
plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from his own original
mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing
the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various
accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as
to represent graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the
light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the
212. Roundtable, supra note 37, at 640-41. He concludes by saying the
photographer's rights are "subject, of course to the permission and underlying
rights of the painter." Id. at 641. At issue here, however, are public domain
works, which are unencumbered by such concerns.
213. See, for example, Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F. 2d. 791, 794
(9th Cir. 1992), which reviews the possibility that all photographic copies are
original but finds such a rule is not necessary to support its conclusion that the
videotapes in question were original.
214. Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The subject
photographs and a discussion of the case can be found in William Allen, Legal
Tests of Photography-as-Art Sarony and Others, HIsT. PHOTOGRAPHY, July-Sept.
1986, at 222-24.
215. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56.
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picture in suit.' These findings, we think, show this
photograph to be an original work of art, the product of
plaintiffs intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the
author .... 216
In dictum the Court suggested, however, that not every
photograph would be entitled to copyright protection.
It is simply the manual operation, by the use of these
instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate
the visible representation of some existing object, the
accuracy of this representation being its highest merit. This
may be true in regard to the ordinary production of a
photograph, and that in such case a copyright is no
protection.
2 17
Judge Learned Hand disagreed with Justice Miller. In
Jeweler's Circular Publishing v. Keystone Publishing, Hand
considered whether photographs of illustrations of jewelers'
trademarks were copyrightable. 2 18 Noting that the United
States Supreme Court had "left open an intimation that some
photographs might not be original," Judge Hand concluded
that "no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by
the personal influence of the author, and no two will be
absolutely alike."
2 19
In addition, Hand found the question of the author's
personal influence, which he apparently equated with
originality, to be irrelevant because:
under section 5(j) [of the 1909 Copyright Act] photographs
are protected without regard to the degree of 'personality'
which enters into them. At least there has been no case
since 1909 in which that has been held to be a condition.
The suggestion that the Constitution does not include all
photographs seems to me overstrained. Therefore even if the
cuts be deemed only photographs ... still I think that they.
. . may be protected.
2 0
As Justice O'Connor explained in Feist Publications v.
Rural Telephone Service, Judge Hand's opinion was among
those that misinterpreted the 1909 Copyright Act by ignoring
sections 3 and 4, which contained the originality requirement,
216. Id. at 60 (citations omitted)
217. Id. at 59.
218. Jeweler's Circular Publication v. Keystone Publication, 274 F. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1921).
219. Id. at 934. Hand never found a work insufficiently original to merit
copyright protection. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 96 at 2.2. 1, p. 63.
220. Jeweler's Circular, 274 F. at 934-35.
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and focusing instead on the purely technical provisions of
section 5, which listed the fourteen categories under which
works might be registered for copyright protection. 221 Hand's
mistake was believing that a work listed in section 5 was
automatically copyrightable, even though the section
specifically disclaimed such a function and indicated that
subject matter entitled to protection was defined in section
4.222
Hand did consider the originality of the photographs, but
only briefly because he did not consider it relevant to the case
before him. In his brief analysis, he considered the
photographs of the jewelers' marks as photographs and not as
reproductions of the jewelers' own illustrations. 223 Therefore,
Hand never considered the special issues involved in
determining whether a reproduction, a work intended to copy
another work, is original. When the purpose of the photograph
is to copy a two-dimensional image, the originality of that
photograph deserves closer scrutiny than the assertion that
all photographs contain some personal influence by the
photographer. No case has ever found "some personal
influence" to be the standard of originality for a reproduction,
nor is it the standard for a work of art.
More recent case law rejects Hand's suggestion that all
photographs are original. In Simon v. Birraporetti's
Restaurants, a photographer alleged copyright infringement of
a Santa Claus poster he had made from his own
photograph. 224 Both parties agreed that the poster, a
photograph of Simon's photograph, was a derivative work.2 25
The court found that the photographic poster, which was
pictorially identical to the photograph, failed to satisfy the
originality requirement and was not entitled to copyright
protection.22 6 The court cited Prof. Nimmer's opinion that in
some situations a photograph may fail to merit copyright
221. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352
(1991).
222. See id. See also Oppenheimer, supra note 128, at 228-29.
223. See Jeweler's Circular, 274 F. at 934.
224. Simon v. Birraporetti's Restaurants, 720 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (S.D.Tex.
1989).
225. See id. at 87.
226. See id. at 88. Simon was unable to sue for infringement of the underlying
photograph, because it had entered the public domain. See id.
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because it lacks originality.227 When the photograph is a




Do Photographic and Digital Reproductions of Public-
Domain Artworks Satisfy the Originality
Requirement?
A. Reproductions of Three-Dimensional Art Works
Photography and sculpture have long enjoyed a close,
complicit relationship, which is determined by an inherent
asymmetry: whereas photography does not especially lend
itself to being sculptured, sculpture (three-dimensional,
static, and inflected by light) is a highly photogenic art form.
* . . In the history of sculpture, photography acts as a mode
of critical intervention... and plays the part of the framing,
isolating, interpreting voyeur.
229
Art historians recognize and study the photography of
sculpture as an art form itself,230 and photography of
sculpture has been the subject of its own art exhibitions.
23 1
Although early photographers of sculpture strove to produce
"a kind of pragmatic 'laboratory work,' 23 2 for archaeological
purposes,2 33 the resulting photographs nonetheless can be
"luscious, or crisp, or evocative"234 and can express a "poetical
227. See id. (citing NIMMER, supra note 169, at §2.08[E] - 2.123.)
228. See id.
229. Mary Bergstein, Lonely Aphrodites: On the Documentary Photography of
Sculpture, LXXIV ART BULL. 475 (Sept. 1992). Early photographers often chose
sculpture and architecture for their subjects "because they did not move, and
because the whiteness of marble or plaster enhanced luminosity." Id. at 491.
Bergstein's article "analyze[s] the extent and quality with which an individual
photographic image inflects, transforms, or even consumes the sculptural
subject." Id. at 481. See this article generally to understand how a
distinguishable variation occurs in the photograph of a sculpture.
230. See id. at 480.
231. See i. at 488-89.
232. Id. at 481 (citing MEDIEVAL STUDIES IN MEMORY OF ARTHUR KINGSLEY
PORTER xiii (W.R.W. Koehler, ed., 1939) (referring to the work of American
photographer Arthur Kingsley Porter who published the ten-volume work
ROMANESQUE SCULPTURE OF THE PILGRIMAGE ROADS in 1923)).
233. See id. at 482. (referring to the work of the American academic Esther B.
van Deman).
234. Id., referring to the work of Arthur Kingsley Porter.
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vision."235 Even when a photographer seeks to photograph a
sculpture in a way that would be neutral, the resulting
photograph can reveal a consciously chosen play of light and
shadow and background that add up to a distinctive style of
the particular documentary photographer.23 6  Other
documentary photography intentionally expresses the
photographer's own vision or interpretation. For example, in
Edward J. Moore's 1910 photograph of a fourth-century
fragment in Boston's Museum of Fine Arts
any and all pretense of fastidious neutrality is denied: a
gorgeous, disfocused, disembodied head floats against a
dense black ground .... The representation of the Girl from
Chios has clearly sprung from the imagination of a much
more pictorializing personality .... Normative conditions of
seeing are denied in favor of an artful lack of focus that
obliterates hard contours and exaggerates the qualities of
softness and dissolution that are intrinsic to the object.237
Styles of documentary photography of sculpture have
changed over the decades. Photography of Italian sculpture
has evolved "from a distant, static panorama, to a more
emotionally agitated close view, to the enlargement of separate
microcosmic elements within the whole."238 In modernist
photography of sculpture, such as the work of David Finn, the
close-up has increased in importance. 239  Finn creates
photographic blow-ups of details of famous sculpture-the
235. Id., referring to the work of Esther B. van Deman.
236. See id. at 484-85. (referring to the work of Max Hirmer in GREEK
SCULPTURE (1957)). "Hirmer's method is consistent throughout the book, aiming
for a self-conscious, normative 'innocence' that remains little changed by the
nature of the individual object. In his chosen documentary style, the extrinsic
emotional temperature is always cool." Id. at 485.
237. Id. Indeed, it has been suggested that the museum-goer who first came
to know Chios Girl through Moore's photograph may be disappointed upon
encountering the real object displayed in a glass vitrine above eye level. The
articulation of the carving, so well captured in the photograph, seems almost
lost because of the "relatively intense, glistening whiteness of depatinated Parian
marble." Id. at 486.
Moore was the staff photographer at the Museum of Fine Arts for more than
fifty years. His photograph of Chios Girl was made when the prevailing aesthetic
for photographing sculpture was Pictorialism. See id. at 485.
238. Id. at 492.
239. See id.
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elbow of Donatello's David, for example- - 2 40 and he has been
reviled for using sculpture as "camera fodder."
24 1
When a photographer reproduces a three-dimensional
work, she makes decisions about distance, angles, lighting,
focus, and background that would satisfy the originality
requirement. She does not simply copy a sculpture but
creates her interpretation of it by where she places her camera
and where she allows the shadows to fall. She creates a
distinguishable effect that comes not only from transformation
to another medium but from independent, artistic choices just
as though she were photographing from life. This conclusion
seems to be the consensus of commentators in this area.
242
Most digitizers work from a photograph of the artwork and
not from the work itself,243 and so a digital reproduction of a
three-dimensional work is usually a reproduction of a two-
dimensional reproduction. Therefore, the logic that concludes
that the photograph of a sculpture is sufficiently original to be
protected does not similarly dictate that the digital image of a
sculpture is original. The image of the sculpture could also be
captured directly by a digital camera rather than scanned
from a photograph taken with a conventional camera. In that
case, the reproduction is likely to be original.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 493 (citing J. Pope-Hennessy, Shots of Donatello, in NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 7-9 (review of D. FINN & F. HARTT,
DONATELLO: PROPHET OF MODERN VISION (1973)).
242. See Baron, supra note 24, at 57; Beverly M. Wolff, Copyright, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMIN., C989 ALI-ABA 27, 50 (1995); Berkowitz & Leaffer,
supra note 76, at n. 72; Oppenheimer, supra note 128, at 237. But see Patricia
L. Baade, Photographic Rights: Case for Sufficient Originality Test in Copyright
Law, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 149, 187 (1996), which suggests that although
courts "assume that studio lighting and set-up are part of expression," these are,
In commercial photography, really the result of standard, published formulas
designed to deliver consistent results. Baade's article leaves open the possibility
that even the photograph of a sculpture would not be original because it has
merely recorded the fact of the sculpture's appearance.
243. The photographed image is translated by computer into bits of
information. See supra note 34. This is because the conventional camera, at this
stage of the technology, still produces a higher quality negative and more acute
resolution than the digital camera. KREJCAREK, supra note 79, at 2, 29-30.
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B. Reproductions of Two-Dimensional Artworks
1. Testing Photographic and Digital Reproductions for Substantial
Variations
[Whatever peculiarities the photograph exhibits can be
explained in terms of the working of its mechanism, no
matter how complicated (including such variables as lens,
exposure, type of film, and development). There are no
qualities out of character in a photograph, no willful
accidents, no gratuitous acts. In sum, a photographic
representation is causally linked to material phenomena in
nature, its image is indexical.2 4 4
The claimant of a copyright in a photographic or digital
reproduction of a two-dimensional artwork can point to
differences between the photograph or digital image and the
original work, 245 but articulable differences alone are not
enough to establish originality and its reward,
copyrightability. First, the variations must be substantial
rather than mere by-products of reproducing the art in the
other medium, and second, the grant of copyright protection
must not affect the public-domain status of the original work
being reproduced.24 6
How, then, is a traditional photograph or digital image of
a painting different from the painting? One significant
difference is that the color in a photograph or digitally
produced image cannot be true to the color in the painting.2 47
This is partly because the photograph can only show the
colors of a painting from a fixed angle and in a fixed light, and
subtleties and variations within color are lost.248 Also, the
range of palate that film and printing inks can capture is more
limited than the range of pigments available to the painter.2 49
244. Richard Shiff, Phototropism (Figuring the Proper), 20 STUDIES IN THE
HISTORY OF ART 161, 163 (1989).
245. "Contrary to most critics' assumptions," writes one professional copy
photographer, "the camera is not a cloning device that chums out little duplicate
works of art, even when the original subject is two-dimensional." SHELDAN
COLLINS, How TO PHOTOGRAPH WORKS OF ART 12 (1992).
246. See supra Part II of this article.
247. See Savedoff, supra note 14, at 457; Lindsay MacDonald et al.,
Evaluation of Colour Fidelity for Reproductions of Fine Art Paintings, 14 MUSEUM
MGMT. & CURATORSHIP 253, 254 (1995); Freitag, supra note 8, at 356.
248. See Savedoff, supra note 14, at 457.
249. THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PHOTOGRAPHY notes:
Absolute colour fidelity with the original in practice is unattainable,
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Rather than being a new contribution from the photographer,
this color difference is a dilution of the original produced by
the inadequacy of the copying medium. 250 The failure to
render colors accurately cannot be a distinct artistic element
deserving protection. Even deliberate, distinct color changes
in lithographs were not substantial enough to be
copyrightable in Heam v. Meyer.25 1 Protecting the resulting
color dilution in a photographic or digital reproduction of a
work of art would create a monopoly on color differences
necessitated by the limitations of the medium and thus
prevent subsequent reproductions in the medium, which
would of necessity contain the same limited palate.
Another difference in photographic and digital
reproductions is that:
The surface of [the] reproduction is markedly different from
the surface of the original artwork. In reproduction, the
texture and bulk of paint is exchanged for flat glossy paper
or an iridescent screen. This not only leads to a loss of color
and spatial effects, it also prevents us from seeing the way a
painting is constructed.
2 52
not only in photography but in other technologies too-including the
latest dye sublimation or inkjet systems, and television and computer
screen phosphors. The reason is simply that the palette from which the
colours of a natural subject, like a painting, or an artificial one are
derived will not coincide with that of any colour film, print paper or
other medium, however you try.
Neither nature nor the artist is restricted to mixing three colours
predetermined by others, whose spectral peaks will have been limited by
a narrow choice among chromogenic possibilities. The positioning of
these spectral peaks determines what intermediate colours and hues are
available.
Comment, Reproduction of Art, BRIT. J. OF PHOTOG., April 30, 1992, at 3
[hereinafter Comment]. Reproduction colorants have different spectral
absorption characteristics from paint, and their tonal and color gamut is usually
less than the gamut of paint. See MacDonald et al., supra note 247, at 255.
250. Visitors to the National Gallery in London could be heard complaining
that the colors in slides for sale as mementoes of the Rembrandt and His
Workshop exhibition were nothing like the original. See Comment, supra note
249.
251. 664 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The digital technology has not
reached its full potential and can be "noisy, fuzzy, [and] full of flicker." Alan B.
Newman, Electronic Imaging Systems for Museums, VII VISUAL RESOURCES, 319,
320 (1991). Again, these may be differences, but they are only failings of the
medium and not contributions of the maker.
252. Savedoff, supra note 14, at 458.
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Again, the photographic or digital difference is a dilution of
the impact of the original, inherent in the reproduction and
not originating with the photographer or digitizer. It certainly
is not attributable to the reproducer's "own artistic
viewpoint.
253
Photographic and digital reproductions are also smaller
than the originals. 254 In Alva Studios v. Winninger, the
reduction of a sculpture to half its original size was not
enough to satisfy a distinguishable-variation test, or it would
not have been necessary for the court to establish an alternate
test.255 This difference in size, then, does not support
copyright.
Reproductions of paintings usually omit the frames.256
Here again, the photographer has made a deletion rather than
an addition and has not done so to express an artistic
viewpoint. To grant protection to the absence of the frame
would interfere absurdly with the rights of subsequent
photographers to copy the painting-any reproduction
without a frame would be infringing, thereby granting a
monopoly to the first photographer to reproduce the painting
without the frame.
Although a museum or software company might argue
that like the mezzotint artist in Alfred Bell, the photographer
or digitizer has reproduced the work in a new medium, courts
have rejected a per se rule of originality for works reproduced
in another medium. 257 Any conversion to a new medium will
involve variations inherent in that medium (it's flat because
it's a photograph; it's luminous because it's on a computer
screen 258), but such inherent changes that do not result from
independent, artistic effort of the reproducer are trivial,
253. Hearn, 664 F. Supp. at 836.
254. See Savedoff, supra note 14, at 458.
255. 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); see supra Part II.C.
256. See Savedoff, supra note 14, at 458.
257. See L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1976); see
supra Part II.D. 1. As this article went to press, the Southern District of New York
found, under British law, that capturing paintings in a photographic or digital
medium was not a sufficiently substantial change to merit copyright protection.
See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
258. This is the "lamented stained-glass-window effect," which also plagues
the projection of photographic slides. Freitag, supra note 8, at 358.
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insubstantial changes that are not copyrightable. In creating a
mezzotint reproduction, the engraver mimics the effects of
brushes on canvas by employing dots, lines, and chiaroscuro.
Although all mezzotints rely on these techniques, the
particular lines, dots, and shadings in an individual work
result from independent decisions by the engraver about how
to represent the painting. Different engravers reproducing the
same subject will make different choices about what marks to
make.
In a photographic reproduction, the camera, not the
photographer, mimics the art. The mechanical process
involved, rather than decisions by the photographer about
composition, contour, and texture, insures that the
photograph will look like the painting. The photographer may
decide how to position, light, and focus the artwork to ensure
the quality of the likeness, but every photographer will obtain
a likeness of some quality.
259
The engraving 'copies and comments on painting
simultaneously,' whereas the photograph 'begins and ends'
with material facts, never extending beyond 'blind fidelity.' It
was Delaborde's position that engraving thinks through its
act of representation, both figuring and assimilating its copy,
whereas photography merely performs a mechanism. In
photography 'we feel that the hand, or rather the spirit
[dme], is absent.'
260
Because the inherent and therefore trivial differences of
color, texture, and size permeate the photographic or digital
reproduction, a court cannot possibly isolate distinct,
protectible differences. Consequently, permitting copyrights in
photographic and digital copies of art would threaten rights to
259. The color correction process in digital imaging does involve greater input
about individual areas of the painting than photography does. See generally
MacDonald, et al., supra note 247. Some commentators contend that this input
is sufficient to establish originality. See Lusaka, supra note 36, at 76-77. The
problem with this argument is that it has drifted from the test of substantial
variation. The case-specific ruling that a substantial variation occurred when
paintings were transformed to mezzotints was found not to create a per se rule of
originality for works reproduced in new medium, because very often the changes
caused by transformation to a new medium are inherent in the new medium and
are not the result of independent effort by the reproducer. The drift occurs when
the logic behind rejecting a per se rule of originality is incorrectly seized upon as
standing for the principle that independent effort by the reproducer creates a
substantial variation. Yet in digitizing, the independent effort makes the copy
even more like the original and so even less of a variation.
260. Shiff, supra note 244, at 167.
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the underlying works, because the reproduction as a whole
would have to be protected. Such protection is not allowed by
copyright law, which extends protection in art reproductions
only to the substantial variations and conveys no rights to the
work being reproduced. 26 1 Granting copyrights to owners of
photographic reproductions thus makes it possible, as the
Second Circuit warned in L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, for the
owner of the first photograph of a work to gain a monopoly on
the photograph of the work, because any subsequent
photograph arguably copies the first.262 If no one else can
photograph the work, then public-domain rights are severely
inhibited. The same is true for the digital reproduction.
Because of the difficulty of separating out photographic or
digital differences, granting the copyright allows harassment
of competing reproducers by lawsuit and promotes monopoly
by the threat of such suits. This is exactly Judge Posner's
point in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange.263 If, for example, the
Art Institute of Chicago photographs Georges Seurat's Sunday
Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte and Jane Artiste
photographs it, too, the Art Institute might sue Jane for
infringing its photograph. Jane will then have to prove that
she photographed the original painting and did not copy the
Art Institute's copy of it. If no one saw Jane photograph the
painting, she may have difficulty defending the infringement
claim, because neither reproduction will be substantially
different from La Grande Jatte except for those aspects
inherent in all photographic reproduction. Substantial
variation, successfully demonstrated, should be of a kind and
degree that allow us to distinguish readily Jane's reproduction
from the one made by the Art Institute.264 Although the work
of two mezzotint engravers, copying the same original canvas,
can be distinguished, that kind of variation does not occur in
museum-quality photographs or digital reproductions, and so
these facsimile images should not be deemed sufficiently
original to be copyrighted.
261. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
262. 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976).
263. 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983); see also supra Part II.D.2.a.
264. See Oppenheimer, supra note 128, at 221-23.
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2. Applying the Skill, Labor, and Judgment Test
Museums and digitizers will more likely rely on the Alva
Studios v. Winninger test of skill, labor, and judgment to
establish the originality of their reproductions and thereby the
validity of the copyrights they contend have been infringed.26 5
The alleged infringers should respond with two arguments:
first, the skill test should not be used to assess the originality
of reproductions of visual art; and second, photographs and
digital images do not satisfy the test as it has been applied to
art reproductions. This article has already presented the first
argument, that the test is unsuited to art reproductions,
particularly in its failure to recognize and accommodate the
copyright principle of protecting only the non-copied aspects
of art reproductions and in its potential for permitting
reproducers to monopolize public-domain images. 266 Even if a
court rejects those concerns and applies the skill, labor, and
judgment test, it should still find that copy photography and
digital imaging fall short of the rigorous standard the test
imposes.
In Alva Studios, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled that when the reproducer
has employed his "own skill, labor, and judgment without
directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another,"
the replica will be original as defined by copyright law.
2 6 7
Courts interpreting the holding have looked for "more than
just the skill of the artisan,"2 6 8 and have demanded "true,
artistic skill"269 rather than the mere exercise of "great effort
and time. '2 7 0 Photographers and digitizers, no doubt, will be
quick to defend the skill and artistry of their copy work, but
even the Alva Studios opinion withholds its benefits from
some highly skilled works: where the skill and effort involve
"direct copying," the test is not satisfied. 271 For all the flaws in
265. 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). This argument was advanced by
the plaintiffs in Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 42 1,
426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), a decision published as this article went to press.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 155-158.
267. 177 F. Supp. at 267.
268. Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
269. L. Bailin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).
270. Heam, 664 F. Supp. at 839.
271. Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 267.
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its holding, the district court did not forget that the originality
requirement denies protection to actual copying, and whether
a work is merely an unprotectible copy should remain an
issue in a copyright case even when the copy is called an "art
reproduction. ,,272
Every reproduction is to some degree a copy, and when a
reproduction is a "mechanical" or "mere, slavish" copy of a
two-dimensional work, it is not copyrightable.2 73  The
documentary photographer of two-dimensional works of art
strives to make accurate copies, faithful to the original. The
value of the copies is that they do not interpret or add or
change, because the purpose of photographing two-
dimensional artworks is largely to provide information about
the work or a usable substitute for the work.274 In the
literature, these reproductions are even referred to as
"surrogate images."275  A professional photographer of
artworks explains:
One unique tool for the study of art is photography, which
responds to a wide range of needs in gathering and
transmitting art information among experts and nonexperts
alike. Common to those needs is the obvious but little-
considered fact that photographs can supplant direct visual
perception of a work of art itself. Historians, relying heavily
on evidence supplied by photographs, make complex studies,
postulate theories, and draw conclusions that have a
profound effect on our understanding of art. The man on the
street forms conscious and subliminal opinions of alien
cultures, more from looking at images of art than from
actual encounters with the original works. Moreover,
photographs are used by curators researching stylistic
developments for dating and attribution of art; by
conservators exploring and documenting restoration
techniques; by museum registrars making file records; by
artists selling their wares; and by educators and publishers
disseminating knowledge through scholarly publications. 276
272. Id.
273. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490; See also Heam, 664 F. Supp. at 836.
274. "Museum photographers usually attempt to come as close to the original
work as possible, and museum publishing guidelines are drawn up with faithful
reproduction as the primary goal-prohibiting, for example, such 'transformative'
practices as the use of details or inaccurate color." Walsh, supra note 4, at 368-
69.
275. See generally Besser, supra note 9, at 589.
276. COLLINS, supra note 245, at 11. Collins' experience as a photographer of
artworks has included a staff position at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. See id.
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Although no two mezzotint artists could create identical
engravings of Blue Boy,277 two museum photographers could
and should make identical photographs of that painting,
because the photographer's goal is to copy the painting with
her camera. Digital imaging has the same goal: "Each
resulting print should visually match the original painting as
closely as possible, without any visible defects in tone, colour,
or spatial characteristics. 27 8
When an art-history professor puts a page from an art-
history book on the photocopier and copies a painting for
inclusion in an examination, no one considers the photocopy
an original work of art that should be copyrighted. However,
the photographer or digitizer who copies the same painting
with a camera or computer, simply to provide information
about the painting or a usable substitute for it, is likely to
contend that the copy is sufficiently original to merit copyright
protection. It seems, though, that the camera or computer in
this instance is merely a more sophisticated copying device
than the photocopier and the photographer or digitizer merely
a more sophisticated operator than the teacher who pushed
the button on the Xerox machine. The surrogate image
provided by photographic or digital copy, with its greater
accuracy, is in a sense the more slavish copy, slavish in every
at 10.
Although every copy is to some degree interpretive, when the documentary
value is the greater value, the work should be a "mere copy."
Every copy, whether made by an artist or by mechanical means, has two
kinds of value,
one documentary and one creative. Even the freest transcription, a copy
by Rubens after Titian or by Cezanne after a book illustration, has a
certain documentary value with regard to its original. This value,
however, is trifling in comparison with that of the copyist's creative
power. On the other hand, even a mechanical photographic reproduction
has a certain creative value, although this is unimportant in comparison
with its documentary value. Thus every copy or reproduction is a kind of
interpretation of its model, just as every restoration is.
Hans Tietze, The Psychology and Aesthetics of Forgery in Art, 5 METROPOLITAN
MUSEUM STUDIES 1, 10 n. 10 (1934-36).
277. This is a reference to a comment by the court in Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, 74 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
278. MacDonald et al., supra note 247, at 253 (describing the MARC project
(Methodology for Art Reproduction in Colour), which sought to improve
technology developed at the National Gallery in London and the Doemer
Institute in Munich for acquiring digital images directly from paintings).
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detail so that it can serve its purpose of providing accurate
information about the image in the two-dimensional work it
reproduces. A copy photographer writes:
From the mundane point of view, a photograph is a physical
object produced on a flat, level plane-an object whose
patterns of tone or color symbolize the surface qualities of a
work of art. As such, it is an instrument for the
transmission of superficial knowledge from the art to the
viewer's eye.
279
Not only is the point of these reproductions to produce a
copy of the artwork in a very literal sense, the copy is achieved
through a mechanical process-either photography or digital
scanning. While image quality may vary depending on the
proficiency of the photographer or digitizer, these mechanical
processes guarantee a high degree of verisimilitude. These,
then, are copies not only slavish but mechanical, and so they
should not be copyrightable. So it may be that the degree of
skill the photographer or digitizer of two-dimensional art has
employed is irrelevant, for these media correspond well with
the concept of a skilled but slavish and mechanical copy that
is an unprotectible replica of the underlying work.28 °
If a court chooses, however, to examine the degree of skill
in copy photography, the court should find that the high level
279. COLLINS, supra note 245, at 12. Imaging literature similarly treats digital
copies as information:
The way an image will be used will determine the amount of information
it must contain -that is, its required resolution and dynamic range. For
example, medium-resolution images of a particular collection may be
sufficient for classroom use by undergraduate students, but contain too
little information for a conservator exploring the technical construction
of a work.
Besser & Trant, supra note 35, at 13.
280. In a decision published as this article went to press, the Southern
District of New York appears to concur. See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel
Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). A British barrister also concurs.
"[Allthough there is considerable skill, labour and judgment required to be
exercised by a photographer of, say, a painting, the resulting print or
transparency will in effect be a 'slavish' or 'mere' copy of the painter's original
image." Henry Lydiate, Photographing Artwork, ART MONTHLY, Dec. 1996/Jan.
1997, at 53. This argument should also defeat a claim of originality under the
distinguishable-variation test.
Another argument, beyond the scope of this article, is that the camera
merely records the facts of the paintings, and that under the merger doctrine,
which prohibits copyright in facts, these reproductions cannot be copyrighted.
See Hodge Mason Map, Inc. v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138-39
(5th Cir. 1992).
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of artistic skill courts have demanded is not met by the
technique and skill required in copy photography and
digitization. Michael Patrick Hearn spent more than a year in
his painstaking recreation of the Wizard of Oz lithographs.
28 1
Using pen and ink on acetate, he drew every mark by hand
two or three times to produce a single color and traced or
redrew every color.282 To produce secondary colors, he printed
primary colors on top of each other.2 8 3 At each stage, he
pulled proofs to check the register and density of color and
continually redrew and reapplied mylar.284 Despite these
laborious and skilled efforts, Hearn failed to demonstrate the
level of originality and skill that afforded protection to the
Hand of God replica.285 His failure does not bode well for the
photographers and digitizers seeking copyrights in their
reproductions of two-dimensional art. Physical skill, special
training, and "sheer artistic skill and effort" have been ruled
not enough to substitute for substantial variation. 286 Alva
Studios seems to have set a rule that could be satisfied only
by the reproduction of Hand of God.
In his book How to Photograph Works of Art, Sheldan
Collins, a former copy photographer for the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, continually uses language that emphasizes
the technical-craft aspects of copy photography.28 7  His
depiction of the skill involved in making photographs of art
does not sound like the "true, artistic skill" demanded by the
test:
The preceding chapters have been chiefly concerned with
technical information and theory, the foundations of
photographic craft. The remainder of the book suggests ways




285. See id. at 839.
286. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976). In a decision
published as this article went to press, the Southern District of New York,
applying similar British law, held that the skill involved in photographing public-
domain artworks did not satisfy originality requirements. See Bridgeman Art
Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
287. Early in the book, describing the role of copy photographer as
documentarian, he writes that "the discipline of photographing art-like
cabinetry and the designing of fishing lures-wears the cloak of a technical
craft." COLLINS, supra note 245, at 12.
19981 PHOTOGRAPHIC AND DIGITAL REPRODUCTIONS
to apply knowledge of that information and theory in action,
so that the skills of craftmanship become second nature....
The sooner you master the technical aspects, the sooner
your successes will build confidence, speed, and
coordination-the ingredients of skill.288
Collins explains that there are six basic steps to
photographing art: "getting instructions, choosing a
perspective, preparing a set, lighting the art, computing the
exposure, and exposing film." 2 89 As he describes how these
steps are carried out in copy photography of two-dimensional
art (works such as paintings, drawings, etchings, prints,
leaves of books, scrolls, and screens), Collins provides advice
such as:
The nature of most flat art requires that an observer look at
it from a centered position for an ideal view. Consequently,
the camera is nearly always placed in the exact center of the
field of view, equidistant from the subject's perimeter. In
addition, the film plane and the plane of the art must be
precisely parallel. If they are not, the image may not be
sharp from edge to edge, and a rectangular work will be
rendered trapezoidal. Misshaping of the image is called
keystoning, a term borrowed from architecture.
2
The section devoted to photography of two-dimensional
artworks continues in this technical and often routinized vein.
Collins describes preferred equipment, the basic ways to
position art to be copied, and the standard way to light art for
photography: "It consists of an even number of light sources
of equal intensity and an identical design that are placed
symmetrically, at an equal distance to the left and right of the
art, so that illumination is uniform over the entire field."
29 1
This standard copy set, Collins notes, "is sufficient for 90
percent of the work of photographing flat art. When the
lighting must be altered, the approach is usually obvious and
288. Id. at 137.
289. Id. He later expands this list to twelve:
1. Select a set. 2. Estimate the size of the art. 3. Position the lights. 4.
Balance the illumination. 5. Place the art under the light. 6. Set the
camera back parallel to the art. 7. Center the camera. 8. Frame the art
and focus. 9. Check for problems. 10. Calculate the exposure. 11. Make
the exposure. 12. Check the alignment of the camera.
Id. at 139.
290. Id. at 137.
291. Id. at 139. "[T]he standard copy-light set is difficult for beginners (and
some professionals) to adjust correctly." Id.
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simple."292 To focus the image, photographers are advised to
get one edge sharp and then see if the other edge is sharp. If it
is not, the camera may not be parallel to the art, the
standards on which the camera is balanced may not be
parallel to each other, or the art may be warped.2 9 3
Clearly, successful photography of artwork is not a matter
of "point and shoot," and a "good representation requires
technical know-how."2 94  The skill test, however, is not
satisfied with technical ability but only by a high degree of
artistic skill, a skill greater than that employed by an artisan;
this level of skill was not demonstrated by Michael Patrick
Hearn's lithography.29 5 In Hearn v. Meyer, the court observed
that the reproduction of the Rodin required "[m]ore than just
the skill of the artisan doing the reproduction; . . . it took
great creativity, as well as skill to interpret, project and
transpose the original Rodin work, in order to create a scale
model thereof."296 Copy photography of two-dimensional art
objects requires no projecting or transposing and demands as
little interpretation as possible. What emerges from Collins'
292. Id. at 142.
293. See id.
294. Snow, supranote 12, at 316.
295. A similar impression is created by reading Sidney Ray, Peep Show, 139
BRIT. J. PHOTOGRAPHY., Oct. 29, 1992, at 16-17, which describes the
photographic departments at the National Gallery and the Tate Gallery in
London:
The Tate uses a massive copy camera on rails with a vertical copyboard
and remote control of the motorised easel holding the painting. This
permits up, down and sideways shifts to centre the image on the
focusing screen without camera movements, presumably to retain the
critical central definition of the copying lens. A vertical copy camera set-
up would save floor space, but avoids the chagrin of an accidentally-
dropped focusing magnifier plummeting through a Rembrandt or Monet
positioned below the camera. It was also noticed that the vertical banks
of copy lights were strategically positioned at a sufficient distance so
that if they toppled over they would not strike the painting on the copy
board. Small subjects such as water-colours are copied, however, with a
vertical system .... Paintings are copied front and back, the latter to
show labels and markings. Traditional copy lighting is used, with local
preferences for tungsten or flash. To control surface reflections and
sheen, polarising filters are used over the copy lights .... To highlight
damage or cracking, 'racking' light is used either from the left or above
where the strong oblique lighting records irregularities in surface
topography.
Id. at 16.
296. Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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explanation of copy photography is the image of a highly
skilled technician, measuring lens axes, positioning lights,
calculating exposures. If true artistic skill is required, the
copy photographer, skilled though he may be, has not met the
test.
To support their claim of copyrightability, digitizers of
artworks have relied on the assumption that all photographic
reproductions are copyrightable.2 97 If that assumption is
properly found to be incorrect, digitizers will try to establish
that making digital reproductions involves a higher level of
skill than copy photography, so that digitally created
reproductions are original and thus copyrightable under the
Alva Studios test. A federal cultural agency attorney has
opined that such companies' ultimate success in proving
originality "depends on how much money they want to spend.
They just need the proper number of experts to dazzle the jury
with terms like 'pixels' and 'color resolution' and so on."2 9 8
Certainly, the potential for overwhelming the jury with
technical jargon is there. 299 The language of technical articles
on digitizing artwork is thick with algorithms 30 0 and contains
such passsages as: "Chord mapping reproduces the out-of-
gamut colour as the colour which lies on the intersection of
the gamut boundary with the line joining that colour's
coordinates to the lightness coordinate of the colour with the
highest saturation at the given hue angle. ' 30'
It is important, however, to separate the complexity of the
underlying technology from the actual process of creating a
digital image.30 2 Too much expert testimony about digital
technology would mislead the jury about what the reproducer
297. See supra text accompanying note 212.
298. Luska, supra note 36, at 76. Pixels are picture elements, like the dots in
a newspaper photograph, and they are the basic components of a digital image.
Arranged according to a predefined ratio of columns and rows, each pixel
represents a portion of the image in a particular color or shade of gray. BESSER
& TRANT, supra note 35, at 9.
299. After all, "[ellectronic imaging uses the technologies of computer
hardware and software, a wide range of specialized computer peripherals, and
computer communications networks. These technologies, of course, are built on
other component technologies .... ." Clifford A. Lynch, The Technologies of
Electronic Imaging, J. OF AM. SOC'Y. INFOR. Sci., Sept. 1991, at 578.
300. See generally, MacDonald et al., supra note 247.
301. Id. at 259.
302. See supra note 34 for a description of the process.
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actually does when creating a digital replica. An appropriate
analogy is convincing a jury that photocopying is difficult by
describing the technology that produces the photocopy. As
one author states, "[tihe concepts and technologies connected
with digitization are complex. There is a basic process .... "303
The scanning process itself "generally resembles photography
or photocopying." 30 4  The digital-imagery literature for
museums and libraries planning to create digital archives on-
site does not discuss the artistry or technical skill necessary
to create digital copies; it discusses what equipment to buy.
30 5
Authors describing the scanning process as "labor-intensive"
explain that the labor is this: "Materials must be brought to
the scanner, lighting set up, the material centered, lens focal
length changed, the scan made, material returned to its
proper location, and adequate documentation maintained
throughout the process."
30 6
Given the ease of the scanning process, digitizers will
emphasize the "technical expertise and creativity" involved in
making "adjustments to pattern, brightness, contrast, and
color" after the scan is made. 30 7 The software for making these
adjustments is usually included with the scanner,30 8 and
routines can be developed for successful image capture.
30 9
The greatest investment in the quality-control process seems
to be one of time as the scan is compared area by area to the
original and adjusted by a technician through the use of
computer software. 3 10 Even so, one image can be adjusted in
303. Terry Kuny, An Introduction to Digitization Technologies and Issues,
Network Notes #14, Information Technology Services, National Library of
Canada, October 1995, available at <http://collection.nlc-bnc.ca/100/
201/301/netnotes/netnotes-h/notes 14.htm>. "Although the process [of creating
a digital image] is not especially complex, it entails technologies and procedures
unfamiliar to many in the cultural heritage community." BESSER & TRANT, supra
note 35, at 7.
304. BESSER & TRANT, supra note 35, at 10. "Depending on the type of capture
device, the image to be scanned may be placed either in front of a digital camera
lens (on a stand or tripod) or on a scanner .... A shot is taken .. " Id.
305. See generally, Newman, supra, note 251; Besser, supra note 9.
306. BESSER & TRANT, supra note 35, at 19.
307. Lusaka, supra note 36, at 76-77.
308. See BESSER & TRANT, supra note 35, at 19, 29.
309. See id. at 29.
310. See Michele Matassa Flores, Artistic Soul, Digital Machines. The Ansel
Adams Project Takes Aim at the Critics of Computerizing the World's Treasured
Images, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997 at 6, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL
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fifteen minutes. 3 11 If, therefore, the test is really one of "true
artistic skill,"3 12 requiring "[miore than just the skill of the
artisan 3 1 3 and more than the use of "great effort and time,"
3 14
the after-scan adjustments of a lab technician should not rise
to the level of artistic skill, labor, and judgment necessary to
grant copyright protection to an accurate replica. Indeed,
presenting the question of whether the lab technician's
adjustments require "true artistic skill" leads to the debate
copyright law has scrupulously avoided, the debate over what
is and is not art, and underscores the inappropriateness of
the skill test in an art-reproduction context.
Although the technical knowledge and skill currently
required may be impressive, labeling those qualities "original"
for copyright purposes stretches the boundaries of a test that
already improperly stretches the originality concept and
further threatens the public-domain status of art images. The
future of art reproduction is the digital reproduction, and in
that future the digitizers may own the most usable copies of
public-domain art, and so, in a sense, they will own the
images completely.3 15
3213374.
Charlie Sliwoski, a Corbis lab technician, is handling original Ansel
Adams prints ... and using the images as guides while he adjusts the
tone and contrast on computerized versions of the pictures .... Beside
Sliwoski in the darkened lab sits Andrea Stillman, Adams' former
picture editor and formerly an art historian at the Metropolitan Museum
of Art in New York. . . . Stillman must approve of every scan of every
image .... Right now, she is pointing to the screen, where the snow in
the foreground of the digital "El Capitan, Winter" needs to be darkened..
. . So Stillman keeps pointing, and Sliwoski keeps adjusting contrast in
the computer. The two stare at this computer screen eight hours a day,
five days straight. In each hour, they will complete four pictures. Yes,
they admit, it's tedious. But at least the photos are nice to look at.
Id.
311. See id.
312. L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).
313. Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
314. Id.
315. The response from Corbis Corporation and some members of the legal
community is that public-domain works that have been digitally reproduced
remain accessible. "If we create a digital file of a public domain image, the
argument is that we create only the copyright protection for that file. It doesn't
preclude anyone else from making an image of that work," says Stephen Davis,
Vice President of Corbis. Lusaka, supra note 36, at 77. This may not be true. If
the museum will not allow the public to photograph works and has abandoned
its photographic archives for a digital archives created by Corbis in exchange for
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3. The Public Benefit Argument
An attractive argument for museums is that the public
benefit gained from distribution of art reproductions weighs in
favor of finding them original. This theme appeared L. Batlin &
Son v. Snyder, when the Second Circuit, comparing the Uncle
Sam banks to the Hand of God reproduction, deemed the
Rodin reproduction more deserving of copyright protection
than the banks because the sculptor had performed a public
service by making a precise reproduction available to a public
that might never see the original. 316 Michael Patrick Hearn
seized on this argument in defense of his copyright in the
Wizard of Oz lithographs, but the argument failed.3 17 The very
rarity of public-domain originals, explained the court, made it
all the more important that Hearn not comer the market on
their lithographic reproductions. 318  The images in the
lithographs belong to the public, not to Michael Patrick Hearn.
The public-domain images on the museum walls belong to the
public and not to the museums. Electronic services creating
digital images for commercial gain are even less likely than
museums to be viewed as public benefactors deserving special
consideration under copyright law.
The reason Congress protected art reproductions under
copyright law was not a belief that the wider access to art
provided by reproductions served the constitutional goal of
promoting the progress of useful arts. The district court in
Alfred Bell made that clear when it wrote, "Congress
recognize[d] that there may be in reproductions of works of art
an artistic element distinct from that of the original work of
a license to use the images, the images are effectively removed from the public
domain.
The story goes that Corbis originated with Bill Gates's dream of displaying
great artworks on high-resolution flat-panel display screens in the Seattle
mansion he was building. Sam McMillan, Content is King at Corbis Corporation,
COMM. ARTS, March/April 1997, at 139; Patton, supra note 54, at 1. "Horrified
museum professionals were reminded of the famous story of the art dealer
Joseph Duveen taking a stack of beautiful photographs of European
masterpieces to Henry Ford [who] considered the pictures thoughtfully, taking
his time, then announced, 'I'll take them all."' Id.
316. See Batlin, 536 F.2d at 492. The author is curious whether the court had
any evidence before it of the rarity of the work, which can be viewed in six
American museums. See TANCOCK, supra note 139, at 623.
317. See Hearn, 664 F. Supp. at 839-40.
318. See id. at 840.
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art." 3 1 9 Congress, then, protects art reproductions not to
promote dissemination of copies but to promote the original
contributions that may occur when an art reproduction is
made. Copyright law is interested in a meaningful return of
images to the public, but it furthers that interest by ending
copyright protection at some point, not by extending it
through protection to art reproductions. The principle of the
public domain stimulates the production of copies of





Because a painting is a unique, tangible object, the owner
can, by controlling access to it, control the use of the image
even after it has passed into the public domain. So, while a
novelty company can manufacture mugs imprinted with
quotations from Shakespeare and the high school orchestra
thunder through Beethoven's Fifth Symphony without seeking
permission from or paying royalties to the heirs of
Shakespeare and Beethoven, the manufacturer could be
barred from decorating the mugs with Holbein portraits, and
the orchestra might be required to pay a fee to illustrate its
concert program with a landscape by Caspar David Friedrich,
even though these works are now in the public domain and
ostensibly free for use by all and in any manner. By
controlling conduct in their galleries and asserting copyrights
in their own photographic reproductions of their collections,
museums wield financial and aesthetic control over public-
domain artworks and circumvent the ending of exclusive
rights required by the public-domain principle. They gain
something like a copyright in works that are no longer
copyrightable. Relying on the assumption that copyrights in
photographic reproductions are valid, companies that digitize
artworks assert copyrights in their digital reproductions and
similarly threaten free public use of public images.
319. Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, 74 F. Supp. 973, 975-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1947).
320. See supra notes 25-38, and accompanying text.
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Photographic and digital reproductions, however, do not
satisfy the Constitutional requirement of originality as defined
by copyright law. They do not contain substantial variations
from the originals, but only trivial differences inherent in the
medium of reproduction, and they do not require the high
degree of artistic skill demanded by the alternate test of "skill,
labor, and judgment." Moreover, the alternate test should be
abandoned as a measure of originality in art reproductions.
Successful reproductions usually do require skill, and so the
test is not a discerning tool and could grant copyright too
freely. Also, the test is incompatible with the narrow copyright
granted art reproductions, which extends only to the new
contributions in the reproductions. Because the exact replicas
to which the test applies contain no visible differences,
copyright based on the skill of execution would cover the
entire facsimile image, affecting rights to the original work.
For these reasons, the copyrights in photographic and
digital reproductions are invalid, and museums cannot play
cultural watchdog and prohibit "More Naked Chicks in Art!"
refrigerator magnets as demeaning to the painters, and
software companies cannot claim copyright violations when
their digital Rembrandts appear on neckties. While these uses
may not seem to be great public gains, safeguarding the
public domain in these situations also frees teachers, in this
image-hungry and computer-literate culture, to project public-
domain images on individual viewscreens in their classrooms
or post them on course Web pages, scholars to use royalty-
free works in books, and artists to continue the deep and
necessary tradition of appropriating and building from the
work of artists who preceded them.
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